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Introduction 
Part I: Leadership and Literature 
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb 
nicknamed "Little Boy" on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, another bomb, 
this one called "Fat Man," was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan during a second 
American bombing mission. Combined, these bombs killed 110,000 people, 
injured 130,000 others, elicited a surrender from the Japanese government that 
ended World War II, and changed the face of warfare forever. Clearly the 
deployment of these bombs was no small event in modern history, and the 
repercussions of the first use of atomic weaponry are still felt today. The 
development of nuclear weapons raised questions for America and the rest of the 
world that humanity still grapples with today, even more than sixty years later. 
Ethical and Political Questions, Yesterday and Today: 
Ethically, there will always be the question of whether or not the use of 
one atomic bomb, let alone two, was necessary to end the war with Japan. To 
justify the decisions made by the U.S. government in 1945, Harry Stimson, 
Secretary of War under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman, 
published a work entitled "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb." It reiterated, 
to a large extent, the "party line" of conserving American and Japanese lives by 
ending the war in an expedient manner so as to avoid invasion and further 
confrontation. Yet, aside from this, Stimson makes several poignant statements 
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about the nature of mankind and the evolution of war. One such example is his 
claim that 
War in the 20th century has grown steadily more barbarous, more 
destructive, more debased in all its aspects. Now, with the release of 
atomic energy, man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete. 
The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also 
made wholly clear that we must never have another war. This is the 
lesson men and leaders everywhere must learn. (17) 
These statements in particular do not make any attempt to justify Truman's 
actions, but they do reference the fear that accompanied mankind's discovery of 
a weapon with which it could potentially destroy itself. With the development of 
the bomb came a new responsibility for those leaders with the enormous power 
to use this technology, and Stimson is right to highlight this change as a crucial 
one that future leaders must understand. 
Truman has been scrutinized by many for his decision to bomb Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Politically, there are questions of whether he was informed 
enough about the issue to make such an important choice; after all, Truman had 
become President a mere four months before Hiroshima. He had not been 
particularly involved in Roosevelt's policy-making decisions while he was the vice 
president, and did not find out about the existence of the Bomb and the tentative 
plans the government had for it until he was sworn in as President after 
Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. Stimson was charged with filling the new 
President in on the technology and helping him to fully understand and 
appreciate the implications of a nuclear program that had, at that time, been in 
development for over a decade. With such a new and different weapon, could 
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the magnitude of the decision to use it ever be appropriately comprehended 
beforehand? 
While any scholars justify Truman's choice by claiming that use of atomic 
bombs was necessary to elicit an unconditional surrender from Japan, there are 
others who still question it, stating that there is no rationale that would explain 
voluntarily ushering in the nuclear age. What is clear regardless of one's feelings 
about Truman's decision, however, is that there are important ramifications for 
future leaders to consider with respect to the choice Truman made. By 
authorizing the use of nuclear weaponry, Truman set a precedent for world 
leaders that is still influential today, arguably more so than ever. In Truman's 
day, the danger of nuclear retaliation was relatively slight; the United States was 
the first and only country to have generated an atomic bomb in 1945. While 
there was always the danger of a conventional attack, there was no chance that 
another country could launch a nuclear assault on the United States in response 
to Hiroshima. 
Today, however, the case is enormously different. The implications of a 
nuclear attack in the modern world are more catastrophic and apocalyptic 
because such an attack would undoubtedly elicit a nuclear response. Stimson's 
point is well-made: there cannot, for the sake of humanity's survival, be a nuclear 
war. Thus, the responsibility of ensuring that the world does not destroy itself 
ultimately falls to leaders, who are charged with having the power to destroy 
civilization, but are also entrusted with the job of protecting it. 
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The Media as a Source of Indirect Leadership: 
In the realm of nuclear warfare, the general public is dependent almost 
completely on leaders. The citizens of a country are not the ones who make the 
decision about whether or not to use nuclear weapons: it is essentially a choice 
that only the leader in command of that power can make. Moreover, much of the 
discussion, debate, and information surrounding atomic weaponry is, and has 
always been, kept secret from the general population. Thus, the public must 
acquire their knowledge elsewhere if the government cannot be expected to 
disclose information on the subject. The media has always been a key source of 
knowledge for the public, as well as a staple in the formation of culture. Media 
figures shape public opinion, and while they do not have the diplomatic, 
legitimate authority of elected officials and heads of state, they do demonstrate 
leadership qualities. This means that there is an entirely separate body of 
leaders who also play an enormous role in the way the general public thinks 
aboutnuclearweaponry. 
These leaders exhibit an indirect style of leadership since their role is to 
provide a point of view which affects the way in which the general public views an 
event or situation. What is interesting about this type of leadership, however, is 
that media does not reach only the public, but also the governmental leaders who 
make decisions. Logically, then, media ought to also have some impact on direct 
leaders as well as the general public, though perhaps not in the same way. 
While the public uses the media as a source of information, the government often 
already has access to this knowledge. Instead, for direct leaders, the media 
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ought to function as a kind of educational tool by which the feelings of the rest of 
the population can be gauged, and a lens through which they are able to see 
how information is presented to the public. 
Nuclear Fiction and Leadership: 
Literature is one aspect of the larger body of media that often gets 
overlooked in terms of its importance. Because it is not based exclusively in fact, 
fiction's ability to impact its readers remains largely unacknowledged; yet these 
writings still provide a venue for depicting hypothetical events in a realistic way. 
Fiction is a place for speculation, the value of which is immeasurable, especially 
if the theoretical scenario would result in severe repercussions in reality. 
Such is the case with much of science fiction, and, more specifically, 
nuclear fiction. Science fiction is a difficult term to define because it covers such 
a wide variety of publications and topics. The value of science fiction as a genre 
is that while it may often be deemed "fantastic," it is frequently also rooted in 
truth. This allows it to portray hypothetical scenarios in a way that acknowledges 
the realistic possibility of their actual occurrence, thereby expanding readers' 
imaginations while still relegating potentially dangerous situations to a safe 
medium - literature. This is particularly important for nuclear science fiction, 
since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated that the actual use 
of atomic weapons is enormously devastating. Nuclear science fiction often 
portrays the way a full-scale nuclear war might develop between nations, as well 
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as the way the war could progress and the conflict's after-effects. What, in 
reality, would be an international tragedy can be safely explored in a fiction work. 
Speculation of this nature is valuable only when it is realistic; if it is not, it 
becomes only a method for instilling terror in the minds of readers, ultimately 
benefiting no one. There are numerous nuclear fiction books, however, which 
are based in reality and whose plotlines could feasibly happen. These are the 
novels which have something valuable to offer to both the public and the direct 
leaders responsible for making decisions regarding nuclear policy, because they 
have something to teach about what could happen. Even those works written 
before the technology was developed are useful in terms of their sometimes 
strikingly accurate predictions about atomic weaponry. The most useful of these 
realistic works are those which focus specifically on the hypothetical war itself, 
not just the aftermath of the conflict. By understanding how the novels' wars 
began and progressed, leaders and citizens alike can better understand the 
potential for such an incident and how to stop it. 
Novels written in this vein are also crucial for the establishment of open 
communication about the subject. Nuclear war has been a taboo subject in 
many ways for far too long, and enveloping the issue in secrecy does nothing but 
foster misunderstanding and fear of its power. Though the American nuclear 
program in the 1930s was kept entirely confidential, even from some of the 
uppermost governmental officials, fictional works on the subject still slipped 
passed censorship restrictions, or preceded the existence of such laws. These 
novels started a necessary dialogue through which nuclear war could be 
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examined and discussed. Martha Bartter references this dialogue in her 
annotated bibliography, The Way to Ground Zero: 
Most Americans assume that the atomic bomb just happened to us in 
1945 - that it sprang fully armed from the forehead of the Manhattan 
Project- and that we have been its helpless victims ever since. In one 
sense, that seems true; but in a deeper sense the bomb grew from an 
ongoing, public conversation. It was openly discussed, not only by 
scientists but also by ordinary people, for at least fifty years before its 
birth. The attitudes that made it possible, as well as those that made it 
necessary, were shaped in our personal, social, and political assumptions. 
These assumptions are faithfully reflected and made real in fiction, 
becoming part of the ongoing patterns of our living. We talked our way 
into our nuclear nightmare, word by word and story by story. As long as 
we remain ignorant of this conversation, we make ourselves helpless to 
alter it. ( 1 ) 
As nuclear programs become more common in today's world, it is important to 
understand the implications of the conversation addressed by Bartter, a 
conversation, she claims, that unites science, literature, history, and political 
events. The use of nuclear weaponry against Japan cannot be taken as an 
isolated incident, but must be examined in conjunction with the societal 
constraints in which it happened (as well as those that "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" 
helped to create). 
Leadership and decision-making, then, does not exist in a vacuum of 
policy and law, but must also take into account the way it affects (and is affected 
by) other areas of culture and society. This interaction must be taken seriously, 
and leaders ought to use literature and other cultural, indirect leadership to their 
advantage; not simply because it accounts for much of the way the public's 
opinion is shaped, but because it is a useful tool for predicting the effects of 
potential actions. Seeing the portrayal of realistic events, such as nuclear war or 
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the use of atomic weapons, not only conveys the way past individuals have 
reacted, but also how the public might reaction to a similar situation. The 
opportunity to see how an incident could potentially play out is a resource that, 
for leaders, cannot be overlooked. Cultural and indirect leaders, therefore, are 
not simply important for the public, but for the direct, governmental leaders who 
create policy and shape world events. Thus, two seemingly unrelated topics -
literature and leadership - are actually inherently linked in the creation of a 
dialogue through which speculation and prediction might help leaders to make 
more informed decisions. 
To argue this point, this paper will first outline the scientific, historical, and 
political events that took place during the beginning of the Atomic Age - from the 
late nineteenth century until the first nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 
1945. This basic information will lay the groundwork for understanding later 
historical eras, as well as the context into which nuclear fiction was introduced. 
Next, early nuclear fiction literature will be discussed in detail, highlighting the 
works of several authors published before World War II. This analysis will speak 
to the development of atomic fiction as a genre, and the value of such works in 
the early years of nuclear technology's existence. This chapter will also delve 
into the relationship between the literary world and the public, and continue to 
flesh out the link between leadership and fiction writing. The next chapter will 
return to the historical side of the argument, outlining the political and scientific 
events that took place from 1945 until the end of the Cold War, depicting the way 
the world responded to the first use of atomic weaponry and what the 
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implications of its existence were in the time directly following the bombing of 
Hiroshima. Finally, the third chapter will examine how these events translated 
into the genre of nuclear fiction, and how works published after 1945 differed 
from those written prior to World War II. In the conclusion, the discussion will 
turn to the broader implications of this study, not just for literature or leadership, 
but also the interaction between these two fields. It will be demonstrated, 
through these chapters, that nuclear fiction works make an important intervention 
into the nuclear dialogue, and the larger context of leadership studies. 
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· Introduction 
Part II: Historical, Scientific, and Political Background 
The events of World War II which led to the dropping of atomic bombs on 
two Japanese cities are, for the most part, common knowledge. Yet the 
complexities of the many fronts and enemies of the war, coupled with the 
inclusion of dictatorial governments on the side of the Axis powers, made the 
conflict especially hostile and secrecy an extremely high priority. Moreover, the 
significance of the scientific advances which spurred the development of the 
Manhattan Project cannot be comprehended without considering the 
environment in which they occurred. Looking at the historical, political, and 
scientific events of the war in conjunction with one another helps to frame the 
actions of Truman and his advisors as well, since there was no single factor in 
their decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan. Understanding the 
circumstances surrounding, and incidents that led up to, the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are crucial to understanding the repercussions of using 
atomic weaponry and the significance of these attacks in particular. 
Before the War: 
A string of international scientific breakthroughs paved the way for the 
development of nuclear weapons. Within the span of merely four years, 
beginning in 1895, X-rays, radioactivity, radium, and polonium had been 
discovered, all of which led Einstein, in the early twentieth century, to announce 
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first the special, and then the general, theory of relativity.· During this time period, 
Rutherford also introduced the nuclear model of the atom and effectively 
transmuted nitrogen. But it was not until Ernest Lawrence built the first 
successful cyclotron (a type of particle accelerator) in 1931 that events began to 
move at a rapid pace. It was also during the early 1930s that governments and 
political leaders began to take notice of the scientific advancements, and started 
to seriously consider the implications of such discoveries for future military 
endeavors. 
The political climate of the late twenties and early thirties was a precarious 
and mistrustful one. In Europe, dictatorial regimes gained strength in Italy a~d 
Germany, while in Asia the Imperial government of Japan had become 
increasingly militaristic. Benito Mussolini and his Fascist government took power 
in Italy in 1922, and Adolf Hitler officially installed his Nazi government in 
Germany when he was elected Chancellor in 1933, after ten years of political 
activism. Once these tyrannical regimes were in place, Italy and Germany 
followed in Japan's footsteps by making territorial advances outside their own 
borders. Japan had made its first imperialist venture in September 1931, when it 
invaded Manchuria and created a puppet state there; six years later, Japan made 
the daring move of invading mainland China. Hitler and Mussolini followed suit: 
after directly violating the Treaty of Versailles (in which Germany had agreed not 
to increase the size of its army after losing World War I) by remilitarizing 
Germany, Hitler made it clear that he wished to make the Sudetenland part of the 
Nazis' Third Reich. Britain and France complied, signing the Munich Agreement 
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in 1938, which gave Hitler the Sudetenland in return for the promise that he 
would make no further territorial claims in Europe. The same year, Mussolini 
invaded and conquered the nation of Abyssinia, extending Italian power onto 
another continent. 
The year of 1938 was also an important one in the scientific world. In 
December 1938, Otto Hahn, a German chemist, was the first to identify nuclear 
fission (Bruce-Briggs 36). Soon after, the phenomenon was explained by 
Meitner and Frisch, and Hahn and Strassman first bombarded uranium. These 
discoveries also marked the international realization of the increasing importanc~ 
of nuclear energy for political and military gain; within a year of Hahn's 
identification of fission, six countries had developed military nuclear-energy 
programs (Bruce-Briggs 36). This was of major concern to the United States, 
since one of these countries was Nazi Germany. Many of the frontrunners in the 
scientific development of nuclear weaponry were German, and there was nothing 
more terrifying to the United States in the 1930s than the possibility that Adolf 
Hitler might control an atomic weapon - especially before America did. 
The following year, 1939, the conflicts in Europe grew even more intense. 
Hitler, in violation of the Munich Agreement, annexed the remainder of 
Czechoslovakia, and Mussolini conquered Albania. The Soviet Union thwarted 
the Japanese attempt to invade Mongolia, but it was rapidly becoming clear to 
the entire world that another world war was imminent. Alliances began to 
develop: France and Britain pledged their loyalty to Poland, while the Soviet 
Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to cement their relationship. 
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World War II Begins: 
As expected, the war was close at hand: when Germany invaded Poland 
on September 1, 1939, World War II officially began - Great Britain, Australia, 
and New Zealand declared war on Germany a mere two days after the invasion, 
and France joined the war on the side of the Allies on September 4, 1939. 
Despite the assistance of its allies, however, Poland was forced to surrender to 
Nazi forces on October 6, 1939. 
Later in 1939, President Theodore Roosevelt was officially informed by 
scientists "of the possibility of developing atomic energy as a military weapon" 
(Bernstein vii). Roosevelt worked quickly: on December 20, 1939, within a month 
of learning this information, the president named a Defense Board and instated 
an official United States secrecy on nuclear research in 1940, which set the 
precedent for maintaining confidentiality on the subject (Bartter 7). 
Though the United States steadfastly resisted involvement in the war, the 
environment Europe and Asia remained tumultuous. While Roosevelt focused 
on America's fledging nuclear energy program, the U.S.S.R. began occupying 
the Baltic States and Finland. Germany took control of Denmark and Norway, 
then invaded France and the Low Countries in May 1940. French resistance 
lasted only a month, and France was forced to sign an armistice with Germany 
on June 22, 1940, officially establishing the puppet state of Vichy France. Italy 
began its North African campaign in the same month by attacking Egypt, and, 
later in the year, Japan invaded French Indochina. Britain, in response to the 
Elberson 14 
ever-worsening situation, dismissed Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and 
replaced him with Winston Churchill. 
It was becoming increasingly apparent that Japanese aggression needed 
to be dealt with in a definitive manner when the Soviet Union and Japan signed a 
non-aggression pact in 1941. This left Japan free to concentrate all of its efforts 
on British, Dutch, and American holdings in the South Pacific. In response, the 
United States, Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands imposed embargoes to 
restrict the export of natural resources to Japan. They also began to make 
monetary loans to China and offer covert military assistance when possible. 
Germany was giving support to its allies in 1941 as well; in February, Nazi forces 
were sent to Africa to compensate for Italian losses in that area. The aid paid off: 
in April, a mere two months after arriving in Africa, German General Erwin 
Rommel was able to push back the opposing British forces in Egypt. Hitler 
looked out for his own interests as well, and invaded and conquered Greece and 
Yugoslavia in 1941. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union entered the war on the 
side of Britain and France, and on June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union. 
In the U.S., responding to world events, Roosevelt declared a state of 
emergency for the country on May 27, and created the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development "to discover whether [an atomic] bomb could be 
made and at what cost" (Bernstein viii). American relationships with hostile 
foreign nations began to deteriorate as well, especially in the case of the 
Japanese government. 
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The United States Enters the War: 
Japan officially joined the war in early December 1941 , and moved quickly 
for the remainder of the year. Only five days after Roosevelt demanded to know 
Japan's aims in Indochina, on the morning of December 7, Japanese pilots 
attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Almost simultaneously, Japan 
launched attacks on Malaya, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake 
Island. The United States declared war on Germany and Japan the following 
day, and Italy and Germany responded by declaring war on the U.S. three days 
later. 
Now that the United States had finally entered the war, the quest to 
develop an atomic weapon and ensure its secrecy became paramount. To that 
end, Roosevelt started the Manhattan Project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee on 
August 3, 1942. In only three short years, the work scientists did there would 
come to a dramatic culmination in Hiroshima, Japan. The Manhattan Project 
functioned confidentially for two years before the Soviet Union discovered its 
existence through espionage. Confidentiality was so important to the endeavor's 
success, in fact, that it was not just kept from the rest of the world, but from the 
American public and key politicians as well: 
Throughout the war, despite the expenditure of nearly two billion dollars, 
the project, known as the Manhattan Engineering District Project, was kept 
secret from the public, from nearly all members of Congress, and even 
from most Cabinet members and administration stalwarts. Secrecy was 
directed at concealing the project and its work from both Germany, our 
enemy, and the Soviet Union, our ally. (Bernstein viii) 
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There was a great fear during this time that foreign spies would steal state 
secrets, and the maintenance of information relating to the nuclear program was 
of the utmost importance. The government was obsessed with being the first to 
develop an atomic weapon, partially for pride's sake, but predominately because 
of the great fear that one of the tyrannical European governments would produce 
one first. If that happened, there was no telling how powerful Hitler and Mussolini 
could become. In the interests of the free world, the United States felt that it had 
to be the first to possess an atomic weapon, and that, to do so, secrecy was 
crucial. 
While the American government worked to keep the program's existence 
a secret, the Manhattan Project, under the direction of the Army Corps of 
Engineers and General Leslie Groves and the scientific guidance of physicist J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, expanded to include another key site at Los Alamos, as 
well as thirty smaller sites throughout the United States, Britain, and Canada. 
The program was a joint endeavor developed by all three countries as a way to 
combine resources in an effort to produce a nuclear weapon before the Germans 
could generate one of their own. Not everyone was on board with America's 
attempts to create a bomb, however. Those who understood the devastating 
repercussions an atomic weapon could have for the world were adamant about 
preventing its development from the start. Before the Manhattan Project had 
even begun, a petition to halt development of such a weapon was sent to the 
U.S. government. Signed by immigrant physicists, its topic was the "dangers of 
nuclear weaponry" (Bruce-Briggs 36). In particular, Hungarian immigrant and 
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physicist Leo Szilard campaigned aggressively to end America's nuclear 
weaponry development program. Despite the scientific interest men like Szilard 
had in seeing the project through, they could not, and would not let others, ignore 
the negative aspects of nuclear weapons - regardless of whether it was in the 
hands of a dictator or not. For the scientists, this fear was not linked exclusively 
to the dangers of Germany and the Soviet Union, but to a deeper understanding 
of how detrimental it would be for humanity to have the ability to destroy itself. 
This document was the first attempt scientists made to derail the nuclear 
program in the United States, but it was not the only one. 
The success of the Manhattan Project was not the only thing that 
improved for the Allies in 1942 and 1943. The tide of the entire war began to 
shift in their favor, and they were finally able to prevent advances from Germany, 
Italy, and Japan across Europe and Asia. The Allies enjoyed many successes, 
from the morale-boosting American air raid on Tokyo to the Battle of Midway, 
which is described as the turning-point of the Pacific war. American dive-
bombers sank four Japanese aircraft carriers - enough to destroy the Japanese 
fleet's numerical superiority in the Pacific. America started the "island-hopping" 
approach to defeating Japan after this battle, cart-wheeling from one island to the 
next in anticipation of reaching Tokyo. In Europe, Mussolini surrendered to the 
Allies when they invaded Italy, and after a failed attempt by the Nazis to re-install 
him, he was hanged by Italian nationals. 
The most pivotal event for the Allies was D-Day, when troops landed on 
the beaches of Vichy France on June 6, 1944 to mount an enormous offensive 
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against Germany. While the Allies continued to drive the Germans to retreat 
across Europe, American troops in the Pacific liberated the Philippines and lwo 
Jima, and the Soviets pushed the Germans out of the Soviet Union and Poland. 
Despite the teamwork the Allies demonstrated in their efforts to defeat 
Germany, the United States and Britain were still mistrustful of Joseph Stalin and 
his authoritarian government in the Soviet Union. It was becoming clear to 
Churchill and Roosevelt that Stalin possessed many of the same characteristics 
they feared in Hitler; Stalin was often unwilling to compromise, and lacked 
humanitarian principles that the United States and Britain believed in so strongly. 
Roosevelt and Churchill were rapidly becoming concerned that any weapon they 
allowed to fall into the hands of Stalin would be just as detrimental for the rest of 
the world as it would if Hitler controlled it. In keeping with this theory, Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill "made a secret agreement [on September 19, 1944] to 
continue excluding the Soviets from all information about the [Manhattan 
Project]" (Bernstein viii). Along with this decision, their accord also laid the 
groundwork for the eventual bombing of Hiroshima: "in the agreement, Roosevelt 
and Churchill pledged that 'when a bomb is finally available, it might perhaps, 
after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese"' (Bernstein viii). In 
spite of this statement, Roosevelt never officially "discussed with anyone whether 
or not the bomb ought to be used before his death; [though] Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson maintained later that Roosevelt never had any doubts about 
using it" (Bernstein viii). If this last assertion is true, then Roosevelt may have, 
consciously or otherwise, disregarded the many concerns and misgivings of the 
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scientists who alerted him to the potential detriments of the use of nuclear 
weaponry. 
The agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt was already made when 
they attended the Yalta conference in February 1945. In addition to these two 
leaders, Stalin was also present to discuss the fate of Germany and the need for 
Hitler's unconditional surrender. They decided that once the Allies defeated 
Germany, it would be divided into four zones: one for each America, the Soviet 
Union, France, and Britain. The U.S.S.R. also agreed to revoke their non-
aggression pact with Japan so that the Soviets could join the Pacific conflict after 
Germany's surrender; Roosevelt hoped that the U.S.S.R.'s involvement would 
help to bring a quick end to the war with Japan. 
In the months following the Yalta Conference, the Allies strove to continue 
their success in Europe, but April 1945 saw the deaths of several important 
figures in World War II. President Roosevelt died on April 12; following his death, 
Vice President Harry Truman was sworn in as President, and Harry Stimson had 
the arduous task of meeting with the new President to discuss the bomb, of 
which Truman had no prior knowledge. Benito Mussolini was executed on April 
25, after the Italian Social Republic was overthrown. Finally, on April 30, Adolf 
Hitler died in his Berlin bunker from probable suicide. Now that the Fuhrer was 
dead, German surrender was not far behind. On May 7, in Rheims, France, the 
coveted unconditional surrender came from Germany. The following day, known 
henceforth as V-E (Victory in Europe) Day, the official surrender was signed in 
Berlin. 
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The End of the Pacific War: 
Back in the United States, Truman created the Interim Committee "for 
recommending action to the executive and legislative branches of our 
government when secrecy is no longer in full effect [and also] actions to be taken 
by the War Department prior to that time in anticipation of the post-war problems" 
(Bernstein viii). Chaired by Stimson, this Committee was established largely to 
give advice to the new president, who had not been involved in the development 
of the Bomb from the beginning. The Committee met for two days at the end of 
! 
May 1945, during which time it concluded that the Bomb should "be dropped on 
Japan without warning in a location which also affects civilians" (Bernstein viii). 
Because Germany had already surrendered by the time this Committee 
convened, it was not considered as a target. The Committee also decided that 
bombing Japan would serve as a show of strength to the Soviet Union, who 
many assumed would be the next enemy of the United States once World War II 
came to a close. While justifying American use of an atomic bomb, Stimson later 
maintained that the Committee had examined all possible solutions and found 
them to be inadequate: 
In reaching these conclusions, Stimson explained in 1947, the Interim 
Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance 
warning, or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these 
suggestions were discarded as impractical. (Bernstein ix) 
The Committee believed that the only thing that would elicit an unconditional 
surrender from Japan was a direct attack on the country; additionally, the United 
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States wanted to present a strong front to Stalin in the event that the U.S.S.R. 
became the next enemy of the U.S. 
With Germany and Italy already defeated, the only remaining Axis power 
was Japan. The United States continued cart-wheeling towards Tokyo, taking 
Okinawa in June 1945. That same month, work on the Manhattan Project was 
once again questioned: James Franck, a German physicist involved in the 
program, submitted a report in which he (and the other scientists in the Chicago 
lab of the Manhattan Project) voiced his belief that the United States would be 
unable to indefinitely keep its atomic advances a secret. Quite accurately, he 
predicted that the development of nuclear weapons would led to an eventual 
arms race, in which production would need to be sped up significantly in order to 
keep abreast of competing nations. Franck went on to discourage the use of the 
atomic bomb against Japan, which was the weapon's rumored target after its 
completion, and recommend that, instead, the Bomb's power be demonstrated to 
all the representatives of the United Nations in an uninhabited and isolated 
location. Hopefully, Franck wrote, this display would lead to universalized 
international control of atomic weaponry rather than competition between 
nations. Franck asked that if the U.S. could not agree to a U.N. demonstration, 
they instead continue to keep the Bomb a secret for as long as possible. He 
hoped that this would enable America to have a head start to develop weapons 
superior to those of other nations. Franck's report was, of course, ultimately 
ignored and production of atomic weaponry continued. Japan found itself losing 
the war with the U.S., which was now focusing exclusively on the Pacific conflict 
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after the defeat of Germany and Italy. In an effort to salvage the situation, the 
Japanese government began sending secret messages to the Soviets in early 
July, hoping that the Soviet Union could help to mediate the situation with the 
United States. Initially, they received no response from Stalin. 
The first atomic bomb was successfully tested in Alamogondo, New 
Mexico on July 16, 1945, and Truman was told of its success the next day, after 
his arrival at the Potsdam Conference. The Conference, attended by Stalin, 
Churchill, and Truman, once again addressed Germany, but the leaders also 
discussed the conditions of a potential Japanese surrender. They issued the 
Potsdam Declaration, calling for unconditional Japanese surrender, but not : 
warning them about the existence of the atomic bomb. Stalin was not privy to 
this information either, since Truman had told him only that the United States had 
developed an unspecified new weapon. The Declaration stated specifically that if 
Japan continued to fight, "the full application of [Allied] military power, backed by 
[its] resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese 
armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese 
homeland" (Bernstein 14). The Soviets, who were not yet at war with Japan, 
were not asked to sign the Declaration. Japan declined the conditions of the 
Potsdam Declaration, deeming it unacceptable because it abolished their 
Imperial Monarchy. Instead of accepting Allied terms, Japan continued to pursue 
a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister. 
This meeting came too late to prevent the impending destruction, 
however, and on August 6, 1945, Hiroshima, Japan was the first target of atomic 
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weaponry. Two days later, when the Japanese were finally granted their 
meeting, they were handed a declaration of war from the Soviet Union in keeping 
with the agreement made at the Yalta Conference. The U.S.S.R. subsequently 
invaded Manchuria and the following day, August 9, the United States dropped a 
second nuclear bomb on Nagasaki. Japan was left with no choice but to 
surrender to Allied forces. In August 1945 the Japanese Emperor accepted the 
previously rejected Potsdam Declaration with only one stipulation: Japan 
demanded that the Allies guarantee the continuation of the Imperial Dynasty, 
which the Americans ambiguously accepted. The official Japanese surrender 
was signed in Tokyo Bay on September 2, finally bringing an end to the Second 
World War. 
Arguably, it was the atomic bombs that made the difference by convincing 
Japan to accept the terms of an unconditional surrender to Allied forces. To 
again quote Harry Stimson, 
The atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a 
psychological weapon. In March 1945 our Air Force had launched its first 
great incendiary raid on the Tokyo area. In this raid more damage was 
done and more casualties were inflicted than was the case at Hiroshima. 
Hundreds of bombers took part and hundreds of tons of incendiaries were 
dropped. Similar successive raids burned out a great part of the urban 
area of Japan, but the Japanese fought on. On August 6 one 8-29 
dropped a single atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later, a second 
bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and the war was over. .. it was not one 
atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender, it was the experience of 
what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of 
many more, that was effective. (98-99) 
The conclusion of years of global war had come down to the cargo of two 
American planes. The power of nuclear weapons was undeniable; for Truman to 
authorize their use meant forever changing the way modern war is waged, 
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expanding the power of the leaders of nations with nuclear programs to a 
heretofore unprecedented level, and asking more of those leaders than had ever 
been asked before. 
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Chapter One 
The first use of atomic weaponry and its devastating consequences in 
"(•' ·•~ 
Japan left much in question for the rest of the world. The American public: and 
even many of the country's leaders, knew virtually nothing about nuclear energy 
even after the Bomb was initially used, and the secretive stance of the U.S. 
government following World War II did little to improve their understanding of the 
new technology. The fear (and reality) of espionage was too 'great a risk for 
those involved in the nuclear program, and consequently the entirety of the 
Manhattan Project and its preceding research was almost completely 
confidential. Even with these safeguards, spying, especially from German and 
Russian agents, was a persistent problem for the American government. 
Everyone, including leading scientists and government officials, was suspected 
of aiding the enemy, or having ties to the Nazi and Communist governments. 
Without reliable or ample information, much of the civic and public sector was left 
entirely in the dark about America's new technology. But even for those aware of 
the Bomb's existence, the theories behind atomic energy were so radical and 
complex that few people understood how the process worked or had a firm grasp 
of its concept. Even if the recent advances in scientific technology had been 
made more public, as the earliest ones were, most of the country was not well-
versed in scientific terminology. In order to grasp the significance of these new 
ideas, the majority of the American public needed discoveries translated into 
manageable ideas and understandable outcomes. Throughout the development 
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and use of atomic weapons, speculation was virtually the only outlet for 
establishing a dialogue about the topic amongst the leaders and citizens of the 
country. Science fiction provided a natural space for such speculation, which 
was a necessary piece of the conversation that proved so importantto,the 
Atomic Age. The need for such a discussion caused the genre to evolve to 
encompass a new form: nuclear fiction. With this genre came the addition of 
many novels that offered insight, predictions, and inquiries about the newly-
developed technology. These works were not targeted solely at educating the 
general public, nor were they expressly written to warn leaders of the dangers 
they might later face with the continued expansion of the nuclear program. 
Rather, these works served as an outlet for writers' speculation, a means through 
which to inform the public, and a vehicle for confronting the diplomatic and ethical 
dilemmas nuclear weaponry could potentially raise for leaders. All of these 
aspects of nuclear fiction validated and necessitated the existence of the genre 
long before there were actually atomic weapons developed to use for military 
advancement. 
The Evolution of Science Fiction: 
Science fiction, as a genre, is a particularly difficult one to define, yet its 
rise in the nineteenth century speaks volumes about the inquisitive nature of the 
times and the various technological advances that occurred in rapid succession. 
There is no definitive subject matter that must be included in the plot of these 
works for them to be considered part of the genre. Rather, the only defining 
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characteristic that remains consistent throughout science fiction is the inclusion 
of imaginative and unknown aspects of life. Science fiction is not exclusively 
"fantastic," nor is consistently realistic. It is generally agreed by critics that the 
term "science fiction" was "first used, it seems, in 1851," though Mary Shelley's 
novel Frankenstein, published in 1818, is often cited as the first novel in this 
genre (Cudden 791 ). Like other pivotal works of science fiction, Frankenstein is 
notable because of its originality in plotline and conception. It would seem 
strange to place a work about a scientist who creates a living monster using 
various body parts and electricity in the same category as novels written about 
super heroes and space travel, but it is for this reason that science fiction is 
divided into subgenres that convey the different methods of imaginative 
speculation used by authors. Nuclear fiction fits in directly with none of the 
aforementioned types of science fiction, which is why it was relegated to its own 
subgenre once a significant number of authors began to write stories about 
atomic technology. 
Nuclear fiction developed as a result of the scientific advances that 
occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Paul Brians 
writes, 
The atom was viewed as harboring world-shattering power as early as 
1895, and ... popular articles and books on the mysterious new sort of 
energy proliferated during the early years of the twentieth century. In 
1913 [H. G. Wells] wrote what is usually cited as the first novel depicting a 
war involving atomic weapons. (Brians) 
These works did more than simply develop a new subtopic and advance science 
fiction as a literary genre; they brought what Cyndy Hendershot calls "an 
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awareness of the Atomic Age to the attention of a popular audience" (77). Wells 
and other writers like him publicized the scientific advances that surrounded , 
atomic technology by making them accessible to the general public in language 
that could be understood and digested by even the most pedestrian reader., In 
the introduction to The World Set Free, Wells has a character explain the history 
of scientific evolution - the development of steam engines and electricity, to 
name a few. This professor also describes the new concept of radioactivity, and 
what it could mean for humanity, depending on how leaders choose to use it: 
Mark what we should be able to do! We should not only be able to use 
this uranium and thorium; not only should we have a source of power so 
potent that a man might carry in his hand the energy to light a city for a 
year, fight a fleet of battleships, or drive one of our giant liners across the 
Atlantic ... Do you realize, ladies and gentlemen, what these things would 
mean for us? It would mean a change in human conditions that I can only 
compare to the discovery of fire. (Wells) 
His optimism is evident in this description of the beginnings of nuclear 
technology, and he points to specific, tangible uses for this new technology that 
laymen can comprehend. Wells also makes this information exciting and 
relevant to the average reader, rather than regulating its importance solely to the 
scientific elite. Helping the public to understand the advances in technology and 
science is crucial to begin a dialogue in which the public can participate, along 
with leaders and scientists, and in affirming that atomic energy affects all 
Americans, as well as the rest of the world. 
Nuclear Fiction's Ability to Shape Conception of the Bomb: 
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Wells' work is especially remarkable for its time because of his extensive 
understanding of advanced scientific principles, and his ability to plainly recount it 
to his readers amid an exciting and engaging plotline. Wells makes every effort 
to explain the progression of science and technology as a background for this 
story, but he also qualifies humanity's evolution from "the fire-stick savage" to 
modern man's "feverish productivity": although these scientific developments 
represent "the bright side of the opening phase of the new epoch in human 
history," Wells claims, "beneath that brightness was a gathering darkness, a 
deepening dismay" (Wells). Wells is not na·ive enough to assume that the world 
can advance at this pace without some negative repercussions, but that is not his 
main thesis regarding scientific advancement; it is still his hope that "highly 
educated and highly favored leading and ruling men [can] voluntarily set 
themselves to the task of reshaping the world" (Wells). 
Wells' description and understanding of nuclear weaponry is also far more 
accurate than many others at this time, because, as Brians notes, 
He understood Einstein's theory well enough to grasp that atomic energy 
would be derived from the annihilation of matter; the 'Carolinium' used in 
his bombs bears some resemblance to plutonium; and his atomic bombs 
are delivered from the air. (Brians) 
Writing like Wells' helped the general public to better grasp what nuclear energy 
might look like, and how the many scientific advances of the time could 
potentially be unified and used for military gain. It also helped to differentiate 
between traditional bombs and weapons and the newer, more destructive atomic 
weaponry. The unique qualities of modern weapons, Wells states, make them 
"strange, even to the men who used them" (Wells). Wells' nuclear bombs, made 
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with the aforementioned "Carolinium," are the "most dangerous to make and 
handle," and result in a "crater that burst[s] open above it, [with] puffs of heavy 
incandescent vapor and fragments of viciously punitive rock and mud, saturated 
with Carolinium, and each a center of scorching and blistering energy" (Wells). 
The creation of these weapons was, Wells continues, "the crowning triumph of 
military science, [it was] the ultimate explosive that was to give the 'decisive 
touch' to war" (Wells). Thus, there is a clear divide between traditional weapons 
and the state-of-the-art ones Wells describes. Not only are they unlike anything 
the world has ever seen, but they are capable of changing the face of modern 
warfare. 
Early texts, those written prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, not only 
allowed authors to speculate for themselves how scientists and the government 
might use this new technology, these works also helped the rest of the population 
to develop and expand their own comprehension of the topic. Nuclear fiction 
played a large role in shaping the public's conception of nuclear energy by filling 
in what Hendershot calls "gaps in knowledge" left by the complex scientific 
announcements and theories (70). Though it was fairly common for new 
scientific findings to be made public prior to the beginning of World War II, their 
significance was often lost on the American people, and even government 
officials sometimes failed to comprehend the implications of the discoveries. 
Science fiction, and nuclear fiction in particular, was able to take the complex 
technological wording of the scientific world and incorporate it into an interesting 
plotline through which the significance of the innovation could be understood by 
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laymen. Moreover, nuclear fiction often suggested what might be done with such 
technology, explaining it in a comprehensible way that helped the American i' 
public to grasp where the world, and this technology, might be headed. 
The ability of nuclear fiction to help create public knowledge on the subject 
of nuclear weaponry became even more important once America began 
censoring the information it released to the public about atomic technol_ogy .. 
Because of the overwhelming fear of espionage, voluntary censorship existed in 
the U.S. long before the Office of Censorship was officially created for the 
purpose of monitoring wartime publications. In 1939, as the situation in Europe 
I 
began to worsen, "American scientists involved in nuclear experiments agreed 
voluntarily among themselves to stop publishing information that might have 
possible military usefulness. 'Special emphasis' was placed on 'uranium work"' 
{Washburn 5). Additionally, the following year, editors of American scientific 
journals began filtering any articles they wished to publish through the Committee 
of the National Academy of Sciences. By the time the Office of Censorship was 
finally established on December 19, 1941, there was little scientific news to 
censor: the scientific community was so silent, in fact, that Time magazine noted 
the lack of scientific innovations announced at national conventions in 1941 and 
1942. Because scientific experimentation was kept so quiet, the Office of 
Censorship itself was not even informed explicitly about the Manhattan Project 
until March 1943, when the military deemed the Office's inclusion absolutely 
imperative to state security. The confidentiality of the Manhattan Project left 
Byron Price, head of the Office of Censorship, with a new problem: how to warn 
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editors to avoid the publication of items related to atomic energy without directly 
informing them of the existence of such technology. It took Price three months to 
develop a satisfactory plan, but 
Finally, the Office of Censorship, the Office of War Information, and 
Military Intelligence put together a confidential note to editors, which was 
issued on June 28, 1943. It asked that nothing be printed or broadcast on 
wartime experiments involving: 'production or utilization of atom smashing, 
atomic energy, atomic fission, atomic splitting, or any of their equivalents; 
the use for military purposes of radium or radioactive materials, heavy 
water, high voltage discharge equipment, cyclotrons; or the following 
elements or any of their compounds: polonium, uranium, ytterbium, 
hafnium, protactinium, radium, rhenium, thorium, deuterium.' (Washburn 
7) 
Primarily, this directive was aimed at monitoring the many leaks in factual ne.ws 
articles and radio broadcasts, as well as scientific advances and research. Yet 
occasionally, as Washburn observes, it became necessary to screen publications 
outside the "mainstream magazines and newspapers" (12). These exceptions 
often included fictional works related to nuclear energy. After censoring one 
particular novel in 1943, Jack Lockhart, head of the Press Division of the Office 
of Censorship, wrote that "ordinarily we do not have any interest in fiction, but 
when fiction incorporates factual information dealing with restricted subjects, it 
can give information to the enemy as readily as any other form of published 
material" (Washburn 12). Only fictional works dealing with atomic energy in a 
realistic way were censored by the U.S. government, but Lockhart's statement 
demonstrates the merits of nuclear fiction writing and its ability to shape the 
public's conception of the new technology. This type of censorship also went 
beyond novels and even included short stories and comics that represented 
nuclear energy too realistically. The government maintained that it was not "in 
Elberson 33 
the business of censoring fiction or comic strips," but that "considerable caution 
[was] needed in any discussion of this topic for the duration of the war" 
(Washburn 24 ). American censorship could not completely squelch the influx of 
speculation and information about atomic weaponry, however, especially when it 
came from overseas. News broadcasts and published works from London and 
the rest of Europe found their way to the American public, and there was little the 
Office of Censorship could realistically do to prevent it. Even in the U.S., there 
were no legal repercussions for those who, intentionally or otherwise, violated the 
censorship agreements, and leaks were a frequent problem throughout World 
' War II. All the government could do was try to prevent stories from publication by 
catching them before they went to print, or demanding the magazine or 
newspaper remove them from the shelves after they were distributed. The more 
widely-read and reliable the source, the more important it was for the government 
to monitor its content. Once the Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, however, many of the regulations were relaxed, 
and most articles and stories were allowed to be published, barring those that 
included specific scientific formulas and techniques - again in the interest of 
national security. On August 14, 1945, the Office of Censorship was officially 
disbanded and the Code of Wartime Practices ended with Japan's surrender. 
The era of censorship and espionage was one of confusion and 
misinformation for much of the United States. Since very little new information 
was released to the public, there were no facts to either confirm or refute the 
fiction that had been published prior to the ban, or the fantastic and farfetched 
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tales that made it through the screening process. Americans' conception of the 
atomic bomb was thus shaped not by whatever recent technological or military 
decision had been made, but by sparse information leaks and the speculative 
fiction left over from the pre-war era. The public was left to fill in the gaps that 
the government refused to; often this was through the works of science fiction 
authors like H. G. Wells. 
Shortcomings of the Power of Fictional Writing: 
Unfortunately, these authors, despite their accurate technological 
predictions, were largely incorrect in their calculations about the aftermath of the 
use of atomic weapons. Wells is, admittedly, one of the most accurate in terms 
of recognizing that any use of nuclear energy would absolutely cause 
destruction. Yet his novel maintains an upbeat tone despite its carnage: 
Only half of the action is concerned with the war and resulting damage. 
The other half details the emergence of a new, peaceful, rational, world 
state made possible by the destruction and death that has taken place. 
(Bulfin 76) 
The concept of rationality is an interesting quality for Wells to choose to qualify 
his post-war society, especially since the hysteria surrounding the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was anything but rational. Wells' characters, unlike the 
public in reality, experience an awakening of sorts regarding nuclear weaponry 
and its place in the world. Instead of involving themselves in an arms race, they 
opt for peace: 
The catastrophe of the atomic bombs which shook men out of cities and 
businesses and economic relations shook them also out of their old 
established habits of thought, and out of the lightly held beliefs and 
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prejudices that came down to them from the past. .. The moral shock of 
the atomic bombs had been a profound one, and for a while the cunning 
side of the human animal was overpowered by its sincere realization of 
the vital necessity for reconstruction. (Wells) 
Ultimately, the Bomb's destructive capabilities are not the focus of Wells' novel -
his message is about the positive result that comes from the damage done. 
Coming to the brink of annihilating the world was the catalyst necessary for 
humanity to understand nuclear power, and to realize the need to containing that 
power. Near the close of the novel, Wells, through his narrator, reflects that: 
Civilization was very near disaster when the atomic bombs came banging 
into it. .. if there had been no induced radioactivity, the world would have -
smashed - much as it did. Only instead of its being a smash that opened 
a way to better things, it might have been a smash without a recovery ... 
[The world] had no belief that science could save them, nor any idea that 
there was a need to be saved. They could not, they would not, see the 
gulf beneath their feet. It was pure good luck for mankind at large that any 
research at all was in progress. And as I say, sir, if that line of escape 
hadn't opened, before now there might have been a crash, revolution, 
panic, social disintegration, famine, and - it is conceivable - complete 
disorder. .. (Wells) 
Wells is not alone in this expectation of rationality and peace following nuclear 
war. In this regard, his work is in line with the majority of pre-World War II 
nuclear fiction writing, most of which also adheres to this buoyant view of 
humanity's ability to recognize and reject its newfound ability to destroy itself in 
favor of universal, eternal peace. 
Frank Stockton's 1889 work, The Great War Syndicate, also presents this 
optimistic view of the use of nuclear weapons, and even takes it further because 
he negates the actual war. Stockton's characters have only to detonate their 
"super weapon" in an isolated location (though they need to do so several times) 
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to understand its power and end the standoff between Great Britain and the 
United States. Following the nuclear demonstrations of strength, there is a 
Reduction of military and naval forces, and gradual disarmament. .. Now 
there would be no more mere exhibitions of the powers of the 
instantaneous motor-bomb. Hereafter, if battles must be fought, they 
would be battles of annihilation. (Stockton) 
Though there is still a devastating weapon created in The Great War Syndicate, 
the novel remains optimistic, specifically due to the fact that the weapon is never 
used directly against another person because enemies are warned of an 
impending attack and evacuate before the Bomb is launched. Stockton 
reinforces his upbeat tone by writing, at the end of his novel, that: "the Spirit of 
Civilization raised her head with a confident smile" (Stockton). There is no 
animosity toward the winners of this conflict for their newfound position 
superiority because every nation understands that it is in its best interests to 
support peace and unity. In fact, Stockton even writes that 
No time was lost by the respective governments ... in ratifying the peace 
made through the Syndicate, and in concluding a military and naval 
alliance, the basis of which should be the use by these nations, and by no 
other nations, of the instantaneous motor. The treaty was made and 
adopted with much more dispatch than generally accompanies such 
agreements between nations, for both governments felt the importance of 
placing themselves, without delay, in that position from which, by means 
of their united control of paramount methods of warfare, they might 
become the arbiters of peace. (Stockton) 
This passage demonstrates how many of the early nuclear fiction authors 
expected and hoped that leaders would react to the use of nuclear weapons. 
This was not, of course, the world's reaction to Hiroshima, but writers like 
Stockton and Wells still hoped that there would be a moral epiphany through 
which tranquility would be established. 
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Hollis Godfrey's 1908 novel, The Man Who Ended War, is perhaps the 
clearest allusion to universal peace in the aftermath of the development of atomic 
weaponry, even though there is no war in the novel. Godfrey tells the story of a 
man who is singularly entrusted with control of an atomic weapon. Rather than 
use it to his personal advantage, however, Godfrey's character uses the weapon 
as incentive to end war forever. Godfrey makes the explicit point that 
technology, even at its most terrible, can bring about an eternal peace. In doing 
so,he 
Paved the way for the American technological wizard who would invent 
the ultimate weapon, save the United States from its enemies, and 
establish the Pax Americana. [Godfrey showed that] even the greatest 
human problems can thus be solved by a technological miracle, 
particularly if the miracle takes the form of something that just might turn 
out to be the ultimate weapon. (Elkins) 
There is something that, retrospectively, seems counterintuitive about this point. 
It is difficult, sixty years after the devastation of Hiroshima, to view atomic 
weapons with the kind of optimism that these authors were able to, or to see 
humanity as the moral, rational entity that they do. Therein lies the problem: 
there is a large disconnect between fiction and the way the events actually 
occurred. 
A writer who publishes a prophetic work, regardless of whether or not this 
is fiction's purpose, bears a certain responsibility to readers. Because the 
plotlines of nuclear fiction works are often so realistic, there was a natural 
inclination to believe what they had to say - especially in the absence of 
confirmed facts from other sources regarding scientific developments. It is hard 
to take their predictions with the requisite grain of salt needed to read fiction 
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works when there is an almost universal consensus among authors about the 
outcome of a certain scenario. If the public cannot understand the science, and 
the direction in which it is headed, the opinion of authors who can carries a bit 
more weight than that of the average citizen. 
The issue with the message of these pre-World War II texts is the 
association of atomic weaponry with eternal peace. H. Bruce Franklin calls this 
misconception the "mythology of nuclear weapons," claiming that from 
"1895 ... until 1945, nuclear weapons existed nowhere but in science fiction, and 
in the imagination of those directly or indirectly influenced by this fiction" 
(Hendershot 84 ). The messages of these authors, then, played an enormous 
role in how the public regarded nuclear weaponry, and, Franklin argues, even 
influenced American politicians: "the American myth of 'the ultimate peacemaking 
weapons' that would lead to world peace ... directly shaped the nuclear policies of 
the United States" (Hendershot 84 ). American rhetoric near the close of World 
War II supported this conviction, since the Truman administration maintained that 
the Bomb's purpose was to expedite the end of the war and ultimately save 
American and Japanese lives. 
Truth Versus Fiction: How the "Myth" Really Shapes Policy: 
This single rationale is not a completely accurate assessment of America's 
policy on nuclear weaponry, even before the bombing of Hiroshima, however. 
The existence of the Manhattan Project was kept so private that even some 
government officials were unaware of it. Espionage and sabotage were major 
Elberson 39 
concerns of both the Allied and Axis powers during the war, especially once Nazi 
and American scientists began to compete for nuclear superiority. There were 
entire divisions of the military and government devoted to breaking the codes 
other nations used to keep their communications confidential. All of this 
concealment and deception ran in complete contrast to the message of Roy 
Norton's novel, The Vanishing Fleets. Published in 1908, The Vanishing Fleets 
outlines the benefits of sharing technological advances - even with the enemy. 
In the work, the United States is the only country with the knowledge and 
technology to produce atomic weapons. Instead of arming themselves and 
concealing this newfound data, America shares the information needed to 
develop the Bomb with the rest of the world. In keeping with his contemporaries, 
Norton claims that the end result of such generosity would be universal peace so 
that there is no need to ever use the weapons. 
As na'ive as this view seems to be, the events of the Atomic Age have 
proven that the alternative, absolute secrecy, does not serve the world any 
better. If the "myth" entirely dictated the policy decisions of the United States, or 
any other country, prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, one would be hard-pressed 
to justify the decision to conceal scientific developments before and during the 
war. Since the "myth" advocates optimism, there would be no reason to fear the 
world's reaction following the Bomb's conception - unless one believed that the 
"myth" was just that: a myth. In reality, throughout the world, leaders and policy-
makers did not accept the buoyant rhetoric of early nuclear fiction. If any leader 
believed that the use of nuclear power would bring positive outcomes, it was 
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because they saw the acquisition of atomic weaponry as a means through which 
they could gain superiority over the lesser nations of the world - those that were 
not fortunate enough to have developed the Bomb. 
Early nuclear fiction writers like Norton and Wells undoubtedly had a hand 
in shaping the way the public viewed the Atomic Age, but policy-makers proved 
to be a shrewder and more cynical audience. The world will never know what 
might have happened had the fears and predictions of these authors been 
heeded by international leaders. The merit of fictional works whose basis lies in 
reality is that they create an arena in which events and scenarios can be 
explored "without risk or penalty" (Scarry 25). The real world affords no such 
opportunity, and perhaps humanity has paid for the way nuclear weapons have 
been treated by policy-makers since their development began in the late 
nineteenth century. How would the world look now had leaders taken the 
peaceful path described in pre-war novels, rather than the tumultuous course of 
the Cold War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and, much later, the debate over North 
Korea's armament? Much of today's world remains mistrustful and wary of other 
peoples and countries and the weapons they have been allowed to develop in 
the wake of the atomic bomb's conception. This is a far cry from the kind of 
world authors like Wells and Godfrey predicted, but it is the reality. Regardless 
of how differently things might have turned out had leaders taken the writings of 
nuclear fiction authors more seriously, the reality of the Atomic Age is that the 
optimistic predictions of eternal and everlasting peace offered by these works is 
certainly not what actually happened after Hiroshima. 
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Bartter's aforementioned "ongoing, public conversation" about the concept 
of nuclear war and its repercussions was not enough to motivate policy-makers 
to comply with the warnings and concerns of nuclear fiction authors (1 ). Yet the 
works of this genre still made the conversation's existence possible in a way it 
otherwise might not have been. The persistence of these authors to publish their 
thoughts and fears amid the turbulence of the times is a testament to the 
importance of exploring the Atomic Age and all of its implications, not only for 
leaders, but for the public and the rest of the world. 
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Chapter Two 
The era preceding the first use of an atomic weapon was a tumultuous 
and tense time for leaders and followers alike. Espionage, deception, and 
coercion were used extensively by all of the world's superpowers to get ahead 
and become the first country with the capabilities to launch a nuclear attack. This 
desire for military supremacy did not fade after World War II; on the contrary, it 
increased. With the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, leaders not 
only learned that atomic weaponry was an attainable goal, they also saw the 
swift and dramatic results that came from its use when Japan surrendered to the 
United States only days after Nagasaki was bombed. America remained the only 
country to have developed a working atomic bomb, which unquestionably tilted 
the world's balance of power in America's favor. As long as the U.S. was the 
only nation with nuclear weapons, it had an indisputable position as the leading 
superpower. No other country could hope to escape devastation if America 
decided to again make use of its nuclear arsenal, and retribution was utterly 
impossible for any other nation in the world. This situation allowed for the 
dangerous possibility that the United States might become a global bully, simply 
flexing its nuclear muscles whenever an international dispute went against its 
wishes. While no nation wanted to again unleash the destructive capabilities of 
nuclear weapons, it was unacceptable to many leaders that no other country 
could retaliate against an atomic attack from the United States. Thus, in the 
wake of World War II, the Arms Race began in conjunction with the Cold War: a 
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bloodless conflict that pitted two prior allies (the Soviet Union and the United 
States) against one another in the quest to become the leading superpower. 
U.S.-Soviet relations, while never especially warm, took a turn for the worst after 
their shared enemies (Japan, Germany, and Italy) were defeated. With no 
common interest to unite the two countries, "it became clear within a few months 
after the end of World War II that the next enemy of the American Republic would 
be the Soviet Union" (Bruce-Briggs 43). This proved, in the coming years, to be 
absolutely true, as competition with the Soviets dictated American foreign policy 
and decision-making. 
The Cold War: Before and After Hiroshima: 
Though the most widely-held conception of the Cold War lists its start date 
as 1945, directly following World War II, many historians believe it started far 
earlier- even before World War II began. America and the Soviet Union often 
found themselves at odds in terms of global policy and governmental theory, and 
their political ideology clashed frequently. Both nations ultimately found it to be in 
their best interests to unite for the purpose of defeating Italy, Germany, and 
Japan and squelching the imperialist aspirations of these countries, but their 
strained union could not completely eliminate the level of distrust that the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States held for one another. Espionage, secrecy, and 
hostility permeated their relationship throughout the war, and once World War II 
officially ended, there was no reason for the uneasy partnership to continue. The 
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latent animosity that had been barely contained for so many years came to a 
head in the period following Hiroshima. 
One of the most dramatic examples of the tension between East and West 
was demonstrated when the Allied powers split control of Germany after the 
Nazis were defeated. Though the capital of Berlin was technically within the 
Soviet zone of occupation, none of the Allies were willing to allow any one of the 
others to have exclusive control of the city. Consequently, Berlin was split down 
the center, with the Western half controlled by Britain, France, and the U.S., and 
the Eastern half controlled by the U.S.S.R. The Western powers chose to make 
West Berlin a capitalist democracy, which ultimately thrived under their 
leadership, while East Berlin was made into a communist entity like the rest of 
Eastern Europe. The discrepancy between East and West led a large number of 
East Berlin citizens to relocate to West Berlin in search of economic prosperity. 
To combat this, the Soviet Union not only instituted a strict pass system to travel 
between East and West Berlin, but they also erected a wall and barbed-wire 
fence that completely surrounded West Berlin and made the territory an isolated 
entity within hostile Eastern Europe. The Berlin Wall came to represent the 
exclusion of Western influence from Eastern Europe and the Soviets' unbending 
secrecy- symbolically called an "Iron Curtain" around all of Eastern Europe. 
The "Iron Curtain" and Berlin Wall successfully separated the Soviet Union 
and its holdings from the Western world, and confirmed the enmity America had 
expected to encounter after World War II. This animosity would prevail in Soviet-
American relations until the end of the 1980s. This era, known as the Cold War 
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because there were no actual battles fought, was characterized by open 
competition between the two nations, especially in the area of nuclear (and 
conventional) weaponry and space travel. The Cold War did not start the Arms 
Race, nor was the Arms Race the exclusive factor in the Cold War's existence; 
espionage and secrecy had existed in U.S.-Soviet relations long before nuclear 
weapons were developed by American scientists, but the Arms Race coincided 
with the Cold War after the end of World War 11, when the U.S. successfully used 
a weapon that the Soviet Union hoped desperately to develop. While the United 
States struggled to justify its decision to use atomic weapons against Japan and 
maintain its nuclear superiority, the Soviets raced to catch up to and surpass the 
Americans. 
The Aftermath of Hiroshima: 
American policy-makers expected a backlash from the rest of the world 
after the first use of atomic weaponry. Acting out of foresight, the American and 
British governments commissioned a team of civilian analysts to investigate the 
physical, moral, and economic effects of nuclear war on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
(Bruce-Briggs 39). Thus, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) 
was formed prior to the actual use of atomic bombs during World War II to 
investigate both sites immediately after the bombing. This examination also 
extended to sites bombed by Allied forces using conventional weapons earlier in 
the war, but it was the nuclear component that provided the newest and most 
unique information. From the USSBS's report, America not only hoped to gain 
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insight into the effects of "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" on Japanese cities, but also 
on the ways the United States might protect itself from similar attacks. The 
USSBS was not only a vehicle for allaying the concerns of a horrified world; it 
was also designed to assist the U.S. in updating its defense so it could use its 
new nuclear advantage to the fullest extent while still protecting itself in the event 
that another nation develop a Bomb. 
The committee's findings about the use of atomic weaponry in Japan ran 
in direct contrast to the party-line America's government had been towing about 
the need to use nuclear weapons to bring an expedient end to the war: 
The USSBS concluded in 1946 'that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, 
and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan could have 
surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if 
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned 
or contemplated.' (Bernstein xiii) 
Yet the administration maintained the necessity of the Bombs. Stimson: in 
particular, "asserted that the use of both bombs was necessary for ending the 
war promptly ... that the bomb made the critical difference" (Bernstein xiii). There 
is no definitive proof to either confirm or disprove this statement, of course, and 
the justification behind the bombing remains debatable. What is certain, 
however, is that bringing an expedient end to the war was not the sole factor in 
the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan; America had a unique 
opportunity to prove its superiority through one of the most astounding and 
dramatic displays of all time. Not only was atomic weaponry the catalyst for 
ending a war, it was also irrefutable evidence that the United States had 
developed the most dangerous weapon in the world, and was not afraid to use it. 
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This was not done just for the benefit of America's enemies, either: many policy-
makers in the U.S. hoped (consciously or not) that the Soviet Union, America's 
past and future enemy, would take notice and resist escalating tensions in their 
already strained relationship. 
Regardless of the justification behind it, the first use of atomic weaponry in 
warfare threw the world, not just its competitive superpowers and leaders, into a 
panic: 
In 1945 and 1946, the popular view of the next war was a nightmare ... 
Each side would launch its bombers against the other, pummeling cities 
into atomic dust, until one side or the other quit, or.both were annihilated. 
(Bruce-Briggs 40) 
The hopeful tone and limitless possibilities of the pre-war period were gone; 
atomic technology had been relegated to the arena of terrifying destruction by the 
rest of society. Essays decrying the massive devastation wrought by even a 
single Bomb were published in the era directly following World War II. One such 
example, written in 1946 by Louis Ridenour, even went so far as to explain why 
conventional air defenses were useless against atomic weaponry: even if one 
plane could deliver its payload (which it undoubtedly would, given the 
inadequacies of the American air defense system), Ridenour claimed, the target 
city was essentially lost. In keeping with these fears, the first General Assembly 
of the United Nations met in January 1946 to discuss the possibility of eliminating 
"all weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb" ("History of the 
Atomic Age"). Clearly this discussion failed to rid the world of the Bombs, but, 
two months later, another attempt to restrict nuclear weaponry was introduced: 
The Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy was published by the 
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State Department's Committee on Atomic Energy, stating that there should be a 
worldwide authority established to control every aspect of nuclear power. The 
U.S. military strongly opposed this idea, believing that it should maintain the 
control it already enjoyed over atomic munitions. The Soviet Union also rejected 
the idea, claiming that it would give the United States the advantage of having 
atomic weapons already in their arsenal, while Soviet production would have to 
be halted until details regarding the international authority could be fleshed out. 
The Soviets suggested international disarmament, but neither country ceded to 
the other's plan, and both ideas were dropped from UN negotiations. With no 
international agreement, each country was left to develop and maintain its own 
nuclear program. 
In America, this meant first ridding the project of Britain's influence. The 
United States had allowed the British to collaborate throughout the evolution of 
the Manhattan Project, but now that World War II was over and there was no 
need for an alliance, Britain was left to manage its own nuclear program -
without America's assistance. The United States continued to struggle with the 
issue of who ought to control their atomic program, and later that year the military 
lost unilateral control when the Atomic Energy Commission was established on 
August 1, 1946 through President Truman's Atomic Energy Act. The committee 
was composed of five civilian members and a scientific advisory panel, which 
was chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer, a scientist who had been a major factor 
in the success of the Manhattan Project. The Atomic Energy Act also officially 
ended the relationship between the British and American nuclear programs. 
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Now that each country was in control of its own atomic program, the Arms 
Race intensified as other nations struggled to develop the technology the 
Americans already possessed, while the United States pushed to keep its 
superiority by improving their weapons. The late 1940s and 1950s were marked 
by the testing of weapons from a variety of nations around the globe. On July 1 
and 25, 1946, the United States conducted the first post-war nuclear testing in 
Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific. These tests, called Operation Crossroads, were 
designed to see how different detonation techniques would affect the impact of a 
nuclear weapon. Not only did testers discover that bombs made a far greater 
impact when detonated underwater, but the effects of radiation were also noted 
to be "a grave threat to the crew and thereafter to the operation of a ship" (Bruce-
Briggs 41 ). It would be over two years before another test would take place, but 
during that time, Britain's nuclear program began to take shape. Its first reactor 
went critical in 1948 - making British facilities capable of manufacturing the self-
sustaining fission reaction required to produce atomic energy. In August 1949, 
the Soviet Union tested its replicated version of the American bomb "Fat Man" in 
the area of the U.S.S.R that is now Kazakhstan. The Soviet bomb was based 
largely on the information they had stolen from American scientists during the 
early stages of the Manhattan Project. This was the first non-American bomb to 
be tested anywhere in the world, and its detonation was not publicized until 
American weather planes detected radioactivity in the atmosphere from the test 
several days later. Though the world was shocked and appalled that another 
nation now had the ability to unleash the devastating destruction of nuclear war, 
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scientists in America and throughout the world were unsurprised - it had long 
been believed by scientific intellectuals in the United States that "any industrial 
nation could construct an atomic bomb given sufficient time" ("History of the 
Atomic Age"). 
Now that the Soviets had caught up to the Americans in terms of creating 
an atomic weapon, it was time for the United States to take the next step in their 
nuclear program: in 1950, President Truman approved the development of a 
hydrogen bomb despite the concerns raised by scientists like Oppenheimer. The 
concern for the development of this new weapon came from its technological 
differences: a traditional atomic bomb, an A-Bomb, is created through a nuclear 
fission reaction, a hydrogen bomb, or H-Bomb, is the result of a nuclear fusion 
reaction - a reaction with limitless yield and, thus, infinitely more power than the 
original atomic bomb. Two scientists working within the American program wrote 
that "since no limit exists to the destructiveness of this weapon, its existence and 
knowledge of its construction is a danger to humanity as a whole" ("History of the 
Atomic Age"). Nevertheless, the opinions of American scientists again went 
unheeded, and the program to develop this new technology pressed on, as did 
nuclear agendas in other countries. 
While the U.S. grappled with the development of a weapon even more 
dangerous than their original atomic bomb, nations elsewhere in the world 
continued to start their own fledging programs, eager to arm themselves with the 
constantly-evolving technology. The Chinese atomic program began under a 
blanket of secrecy when, in 1951, they signed an agreement with the Soviet 
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Union to exchange Chinese uranium for Soviet technical expertise in bomb 
construction. This loose alliance gave an advantage to both China and the 
Soviet Union in their quest to compete with the American program. The next 
year, Britain detonated its first atomic bomb in Western Australia, making it the 
third country to successfully produce the technology. The United States soon 
upped the ante, however, when it detonated the first hydrogen bomb less than a 
month after the British tested their A-Bomb. It took the U.S.S.R. just under a 
year to catch up with American technology, and though the hydrogen bomb the 
Soviets tested on August 12, 1953 was less powerful than the American model, it 
was already useable for warfare, whereas the United States' model remained 
undeliverable. Churchill started his scientists on a program to create an H-Bomb 
in 1954, though it would take them until the end of 1957 to successfully do so. 
Frightened by the rate at which the Soviet Union was creating atomic weapons, 
the United States tested its first deliverable hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll on 
March 1, 1954. This detonation represented the largest nuclear weapon ever 
tested, and it also made the effects of the nuclear age a startling reality for 
residents of the islands 300 miles away from the testing ground, who, ten years 
after the test, began to develop thyroid tumors. It was later reported that "of 
those under 12 on [the island] at the time of [the test], 90% have developed 
thyroid tumors" in the decade following the test ("History of the Atomic Age"). But 
the world's superpowers continued the Arms Race even amid the concerns of 
civilians and scientists alike, who pointed to the many harmful consequences of 
radiation, contamination, and destruction as evidence to stop the development of 
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atomic weapons. Policy-makers, however, refused to end the nuclear era: the 
Soviets detonated another H-Bomb in 1955, the British followed two years later, 
and the French developed their first A-Bomb in 1960. Only a brief hiatus of 
nuclear testing existed near the end of the 1950s during a failed multi-national 
attempt to make disarmament a reality. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 
conjunction with the British government, made an offer to halt nuclear testing 
provided that the U.S.S.R. also cease all of its tests. During a series of 
negotiations, Premier Vladimir Khrushchev and Eisenhower extended various 
proposals to one another, but could never agree on all points. While discussing 
the issue, however, all sides did, temporarily, agree to stop nuclear testing until 
the end of 1959 - so long as the other nations also adhered to this restriction. 
When 1960 began with no further agreement between the Soviets, Americans, 
and British, all countries were again officially free to test whatever nuclear 
weapons they chose. The United States, unwilling to allow this regression, 
proposed a new ban on nuclear testing in 1961 - this one lasting three years. 
The Soviet Union not only rejected the policy, but resumed their nuclear testing 
later that same year, when it exploded the largest nuclear weapon ever created -
a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 58 megatons, more than four times the payload 
of the bomb the United States tested in 1954. 
This was a dangerous change in the power balance for America, which 
could no longer enjoy its prior status as the world's most elite superpower. It was 
especially worrisome for the United States because so little had been done for 
the country's strategic defense in the wake of World War II. Since the Soviets 
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traditionally had poor aviation and naval expertise, and, until recently, no nuclear 
weapons, America found it unnecessary to expand upon their pre-existing 
defense system because they believed the U.S.S.R. had few capabilities for 
reaching the United States. The Soviet Union wasted no time in flaunting its 
newfound nuclear superiority, and, less than a year after testing its new weapon, 
the Soviet Union helped to bring the world as close as it has ever been to full-
scale nuclear warfare by placing weapons dangerously close to the United 
States. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis and its Repercussions: 
On October 14, 1962, an American reconnaissance plane making a 
routine flight over Cuba discovered missile sites under construction on the island. 
While it was not learned until much later that the missiles were armed with 
nuclear warheads, there was still great cause for concern about the existence of 
missiles so close to American shores. Under the control of Communist dictator 
Fidel Castro, Cuba was known to look to the Soviet Union as a source of 
Communist leadership and support, and President John F. Kennedy wasted no 
time in convening a team of his closest advisors, which would come to be known 
as ExComm (Executive Committee) and would meet several times daily until the 
end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Committee, divided on whether to 
implement military or diplomatic actions, waited until October 22 to order a naval 
blockade of Cuba and put the United States military on DEFCOM level 2, the 
rarely-used, second-highest level of military preparedness. Having failed thus far 
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to get a positive response from Moscow, Kennedy hoped this drastic step would 
convince Premier Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba. It took six 
more days, but Khrushchev eventually did just that, agreeing to remove the 
missiles from Cuba if America recalled its missiles from Turkey, which the 
Soviets felt were equally threatening to their nation. Though the confrontation 
lasted only two weeks, the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis has helped to 
shape much of the Atomic Age. 
Changes were implemented on both sides of the Atlantic to prevent similar 
standoffs from occurring in the future: in particular, "the famous 'hotline' was 
installed between the US and the Soviet Union to help resolve future conflicts" 
("History of the Atomic Age"). This direct connection would help to avoid any 
miscommunication between the two nations, or mistaken receipt of instructions 
from someone other than either country's leader. It was also during this time that 
the United States officially accepted responsibility for the thyroid cancer caused 
by their earlier nuclear testing on Bikini Atoll, and granted monetary 
compensation to those affected by the disease. Coming to the brink of nuclear 
warfare had also inspired American and Soviet leaders alike to begin 
negotiations on a Limited Test Ban Treaty (L TBT), which would restrict the 
amount of nuclear testing any country could conduct, thus limiting the world's 
collective nuclear arsenal. It took almost a year of discussion and concessions 
from all sides, but the L TBT was finally signed by the United States, Britain, and 
the Soviet Union in 1963. It ended atmospheric, underwater, and outer space 
nuclear testing. Since its conception, an additional 113 countries have also 
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signed the treaty ("History of the Atomic Age"). The L TBT brought about an era 
of relaxed tensions and peace that was very different from the strained hostilities 
generally prevalent during the Cold War. This period marked a detente for the 
superpowers of the world, none of whom could identify a forerunner in the 
nuclear arms race. Instead, a new theory of "mutually assured destruction" was 
generally accepted. This idea essentially acknowledged that each country knew 
the other had the capabilities to launch a second-strike in retaliation to any first-
strike made against them; thus, no matter who started the war, both countries 
knew they would suffer great losses should a nuclear confrontation ever take 
place. Efforts aimed at preventing such a calamity seemed to be taking place 
throughout the world, as each of the world's superpowers began to develop and 
construct anti-missile defense systems while simultaneously scaling back their 
nuclear production in accordance with the L TBT. 
The focus in the 1960s shifted away from the quest to develop the most 
destructive weapon possible. Instead, the priority became the assurance of 
global and national safety in a world equipped with nuclear weapons. Both the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union created several versions of a missile defense system 
for their respective country, which could defend against long-range missile 
launches, as well as bombs dropped directly from planes. Yet no matter how 
much progress the L TBT seemed to demonstrate in steering the world away from 
the use of nuclear weaponry, the leaders of other countries could not accept 
detente. In 1964, the Chinese tested their first nuclear device, and, three years 
later, they had developed and tested a functioning hydrogen bomb as well. 
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France detonated its first hydrogen bomb over an island in the Pacific in 1968, 
leaving the island uninhabitable for the next six years. Both China and France 
had notably refused to sign the L TBT when it was agreed upon in 1963, and their 
rejection of arms limitations put a strain on the promises made by the rest of the 
countries who had signed the treaty. 
Regardless of each nation's stance on limiting the production of atomic 
weapons, there was an irrefutable drain on the economies of all nations with 
nuclear programs and anti-missile defense systems. In 1969, the world's 
superpowers were spending about $50 million dollars a day to operate their 
atomic programs ("History of the Atomic Age"). This expense was felt especially 
hard by America, which was also under the economic stress of funding the 
Vietnam War. Coupled with the progress made towards ending the Cold War by 
the L TBT, this excessive expense helped to prompt the beginning of an even 
more restrictive international nuclear treaty- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) treaty. It took three years of negotiations, but finally the United States 
and Soviet Union were able to reach an agreement, and the SALT I treaty was 
officially signed in May 1972. This accord froze the number of strategic ballistic 
missile launchers each country could possess at their current level. Only by 
dismantling launchers could a country build new ones, which essentially negated 
the motivation to participate in an Arms Race between America and the U.S.S.R. 
Still, as with the L TBT, there were countries who could not accept the end 
of nuclear competition. Just months after the SALT I treaty was signed, the 
Prime Minister of India authorized his country to develop a nuclear program of its 
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own, which produced its first weapon less than two years after its c~nception. 
India refused to acknowledge its participation in a violent Arms Race; instead, the 
Prime Minister claimed the underground detonation was aimed at improving 
mining techniques and other engineering technology. The world rejected this 
rationale, however, believing instead that India was merely trying to develop a 
weapon strong enough to make it an international competitor. While India stood 
by its stance of peaceful technological development, international opinion 
berated the newest atomic power for going against the trend of detente and 
disarmament. 
Nuclear Disasters Prompt Change: 
Arguably, however, this inclination towards peace was nothing more than 
a fa9ade adopted by both the United States and the Soviet Union. After signing 
the SALT I treaty and preaching disarmament, neither superpower seemed 
particularly inclined to surrender their atomic edge. While the Soviets began to 
replace all of their allotted ballistic missile launchers with newer versions whose 
improved range could now reach targets in Western Europe, the United States 
pressured European nations to allow American missile launchers on their soil, as 
a last resort to compete with the Soviets. Throughout this time period, 
negotiations had begun between the two nations about expanding the SALT I 
treaty to make it more restrictive, but it took a near-tragedy to emphasize the 
dangers of continuing down the path of nuclear advancement. 
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In the early morning hours of March 28, 1979, the American nuclear site at 
Three-Mile Island in Pennsylvania experienced a partial core meltdown in one of 
the site's reactors. Though no one was killed by the accident itself, radioactive 
material was released into the atmosphere, and 140,000 Americans fled the 
island in fear of the incident. Aside from terrifying the nation and displacing many 
of its citizens, the clean-up process was a lengthy and costly one for the United 
States.- Through months of expensive testing and thousands of environmental 
samples, the government ultimately determined that the dose of radiation to 
which those in the immediate area had been exposed was extremely low and not 
at all dangerous. In addition to assuring the environmental safety of the island, 
the reactor site needed to be monitored and decontaminated - it took experts 
and government officials until 1993 to adequately defuel, drain, and shut down 
the nuclear reactor. Three-Mile Island represents the worst nuclear incident in 
American history, and it epitomized the fears of those who opposed atomic 
technology. 
It is no coincidence that the SALT II treaty was signed only a few months 
after the disaster at Three-Mile Island. The potential for disaster during 
peacetime from merely producing nuclear weapons or energy was too great a 
risk or possibility for the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
ignore. Three-Mile Island, though it was the most extreme example of the 
accidental dangers of nuclear technology, was not an isolated incident. Plants in 
Idaho and Detroit had already experienced accidents which led to minor 
emissions of radiation into the atmosphere in 1961 and 1966. Neither reactor 
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melted down like the one at Three-Mile Island, but the number of nuclear 
mishaps was becoming alarmingly dangerous to civilians living near the plants, 
as well as the environment. The SALT II treaty was the first to be aimed at 
actually reducing - not just maintaining - the nuclear arsenal of both countries, 
and was the most restrictive step thus far in controlling production in the Atomic 
Age. 
The promises of and sentiment behind SALT II were forgotten before the 
treaty could even become a law, however. When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1980, President Jimmy Carter revoked the SALT II treaty before it 
could be ratified by the U.S. Senate, the last aspect of the process required for it 
to officially become part of American policy. The next year, when Ronald 
Reagan became president, he enacted a bevy of changes which also ran counter 
to the theory of detente. In addition to reversing the attempts Carter had made to 
halt further American reliance on nuclear power and energy as an alternative fuel 
to oil, Reagan upped the American military budget in an attempt to outspend the 
Soviets and proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which would come to 
be known popularly as "Star Wars." This system was a high-tech anti-missile 
system based in space which could defend the United States against potential 
nuclear attacks - namely from the Soviet Union. 
Fortunately, the Soviets had problems that took precedence over attacking 
the United States. Shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the U.S.S.R., a 
nuclear disaster far worse than Three-Mile Island occurred in the Ukraine. On 
April 26, 1986, the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl exploded, releasing thirty to forty 
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times the amount of radioactivity created by Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the 
atmosphere. The core experienced a partial meltdown, and the Soviet Union 
launched a massive attempt to cover up the disaster. The secrecy lasted only 
two days, however, because Sweden detected high levels of radiation in the 
atmosphere and demanded an explanation from Soviet officials. In response, 
Gorbachev admitted the tragedy publicly and erected a large metal and concrete 
shell over the reactor to prevent any more radioactive material from escaping into 
the atmosphere. When all the information regarding Chernobyl was finally made 
public, it was revealed that thirty-two people had been killed in the initial 
explosion, and an immeasurable number suffered radiation illness or poisoning. 
As a direct result of this event, Gorbachev proposed a fifty percent reduction in 
the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The agreement ultimately 
failed, but it represented a huge step for Soviet policy-making that the initiative 
for arms reduction had come directly from the Soviet Premier. 
The End of the Cold War: 
Even though Gorbachev's proposal failed, the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces Treaty did not. It was signed in December 1987, and it eliminated an 
entire class of nuclear weapons. Coupled with Gorbachev's new policy of 
glasnost ("openness") for the Soviet Union, this treaty brought the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. closer to ending their conflict. It took another two years for the 
Berlin Wall to come down, an event representing a defeat for communism and a 
progressive step towards uniting the East and West. Finally, on December 8, 
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1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved, instead forming the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The replacement of the U.S.S.R. by the C.I.S. symbolized 
the end of the Cold War. While the conclusion of this conflict did not bring an 
end to the Atomic Age, it definitively ended the imminent threat of nuclear war 
between East and West. The world had come dangerously close to nuclear 
disaster numerous times since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the 
end of the Cold War and the numerous treaties signed by the world's 
superpowers symbolized the end of the immediate risk of nuclear hostilities 
between the Soviets and Americans. 
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Chapter Three 
The Changing Face of Nuclear Fiction: 
With the bombing of Hiroshima came a marked change in the way the 
world responded to nuclear technology. No longer was atomic weaponry a 
source of hope and promise for the world; instead, it became a greatly feared 
weapon that many worried would destroy the world. As superpowers grappled 
with the implications of wielding such destructive weapons, the general 
population struggled to understand what this new technology would mean for 
their future. Nuclear fiction scholar Paul Brians describes the post-war world as 
one in conflict, torn between "exhilaration and alarm" at recent events (8). With 
the Cold War in full swing and Communist espionage a major concern of the U.S. 
government, the American public could not be certain that its nuclear superiority 
would persist. In search of greater perspective and more information about the 
new technology, the public turned to other outlets to determine the way nuclear 
power would affect the world around them. Fortunately, the number of nuclear 
fiction novels published in the period immediately following the end of World War 
II increased rapidly and dramatically, offering the public a large base of works to 
choose from. So much was written about atomic weaponry in the late 1940s, in 
fact, that in 1952 the editor of one of the leading science fiction periodicals 
complained that too many of the magazine's submissions dealt with nuclear war: 
he introduced the issue by grumbling that so many essays "still nag away at 
atomic, hydrogen and bacteriological war, the post-atomic world, ... war, more 
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war, and still more war" (Gold 2). Atomic fiction, in addition to becoming much 
more prominent after World War II, had also undergone a dramatic change in 
tone. In the years between the implementation of censorship laws and the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, science fiction authors had become far 
more pessimistic about the repercussions of nuclear technology. 
The difference in the tone of atomic fiction before and after the bombing of 
Hiroshima is neither a subtle nor a gradual one, and it happened almost 
instantaneously. The December 1945 issue of the science fiction periodical 
Astounding featured the first published piece of post-war atomic fiction. Titled 
"August Sixth 1945," the short story was written by Theodore Sturgeon and 
reflected the new negative philosophy of nuclear fiction in the wake of World War 
II: man, Sturgeon asserted, "learned on August 6, 1945 that he alone is big 
enough to kill himself, or to live forever" (Sturgeon). The ominous tone of works 
like Sturgeon's did not go unnoticed by those outside the literary community. 
Edward Teller, who invented the hydrogen bomb and was a driving force in the 
development of the Star Wars system, was a science fiction fan prior to 1945. 
After the end of World War II, however, Teller remarked that he could no longer 
read nuclear fiction. "My tastes did not change," he argued. Rather, "science 
fiction did. Reflecting the general attitude, the stories used to say, 'How 
wonderful.' Now they say, 'How horrible"' (Wager 448). Far from touting nuclear 
power as the development that would establish universal peace, writers now 
foretold an apocalyptic ending to any future use of atomic weaponry. Peter 
Ruppert, who reviewed David Seed's American Science Fiction and the Cold 
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War: Literature and Film, called post-World War II nuclear fiction "overwhelmingly 
dystopian," and for good reason: hypothetical nuclear wars rarely ended in the· 
hopeful fashion they had prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, and greater 
emphasis was placed on the need to prevent war from happening in the first 
place (258 ). 
Though the tone of these novels was in keeping with the public's new fear 
of nuclear war, the sheer volume of works related to this topic arguably made the 
likelihood seem all that much greater to readers - a dangerous possibility for the 
public to become comfortable with, yet one they needed to accept in the wake of 
the reality of Hiroshima. The existence of these novels created a new arena in 
which the dialogue of the Atomic Age continued to take place - they symbolized 
a change in the perceptions of nuclear weapons, and helped readers to better 
understand how public opinion has been altered in the interim during which 
censorship was enforced. Before the war, the public was comfortable with the 
hope and promise nuclear technology was purported to offer them; once 
Hiroshima demonstrated the destruction that came with atomic weapons, it was 
necessary to reframe the discussion in a way that recognized this shift. By 
releasing such a large body of works in a time when fear dominated public 
conception of nuclear weaponry, science fiction authors helped the public to 
regain the level of understanding and comfort they had previously enjoyed so 
that the dialogue could begin again. Isaac Asimov asserted that '"the dropping of 
the atomic bomb in 1945 made science fiction respectable,"' but, more than that, 
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it made it nuclear fiction relevant to the world outside the science fiction 
community (Seed 8). Suddenly nuclear war was not just a fantasy, it was reality. 
Apocalyptic Endings and Tragic Repercussions: 
Much of early nuclear fiction offers prophetic speculation about the course 
of technological advances, yet misses the mark in predicting human response to 
such developments. Post-World War II fiction interacted differently with humanity 
because it did not take the same optimistic stance about mankind's ability to 
react positively and peacefully to the development of nuclear weapons. Instead, 
newer novels were more realistic in their acceptance of the negative 
repercussions associated with the Atomic Age. According to W. Warren Wager, 
Writers of science fiction foresaw nearly every horror of the nuclear age 
several years or decades before it materialized and, as soon as it did 
materialize, every horror yielded a profusion of tales developing its 
implications .. .for the future of humankind. Fiction anticipated truth and 
truth provoked more fiction. (448) 
The element of prediction was still present in later fiction, but it was extended to 
encompass the negative implications that were now associated with nuclear 
technology. Each hypothetical wartime scenario ended in any number of horrific 
ways; destruction of entire cities and the decimation of a large portion of the 
nation's population hardly approach the depths authors were willing to go to in 
order to accurately describe the horror of nuclear war. Rather than "old-
fashioned deliverance by technology," these authors painted a much darker 
picture of "bleak post-holocaust landscapes" (Wager 448). Such is the case in 
Bernard Wolfe's 1952 novel Limbo, which tells the story of a doctor who flees the 
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United States for an uncharted Pacific island when World War Ill breaks out,· 
though the novel takes place after the war has already ended. While Wolfe does 
not include the war directly in his plotline, he describes it as being "grotesque," 
and its participants "monstrous" (40). Its repercussions are no less distressing: 
the America of Wolfe's work is a conquered and marginalized one, composed of 
a disheartened population and a mere fraction of the territory it once 
encompassed. Soviet bombing raids during the war have rendered every U.S. 
seaboard utterly uninhabitable, and the newly-appointed Soviet dictator refuses 
to even consider repairing the damaged cities. The novel is an extreme and vivid 
picture of the demoralized Americans who live amid the wastelands that were 
once their finest cities. Similarly disconcerting is Douglas Terman's 1980 work, 
Free Flight, in which the U.S. again loses a nuclear war. Once it defeats the 
United States, the Soviet Union is free to institute a world-wide totalitarian 
regime, under which the American people clearly suffer. The Soviets use the 
United States to produce exports while keeping them under strict regulations that 
include the use of ration coupons for food and the banning of weapons. America 
falls deep into poverty, regressing back to an agrarian society based largely 
around a feudal hierarchy and the barter system. Loyalty and national identity 
are lost in this new society, where the government encourages its citizens to 
report fellow Americans who fail to adhere to the nation's rules. 
Describing a desolate, conquered United States is not the only way 
authors portray the negative aspects of nuclear warfare. Bernard Newman's 
Shoot, published in 1949, presents a different, and less severe, example of the 
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dangers of nuclear weaponry than do Terman's and Wolfe's works. During the 
hypothetical World War Ill the Americans and Soviets use nuclear technology 
amid a simultaneous Soviet invasion of Europe. As the war stretches on and 
new technologies evolve, Europe begins to experience a sudden upswing in the 
number of cases of cancer they diagnose. Disease is not the only change in 
European lifestyle - crop failures also permeate the continent with the advent 
and use of different atomic weapons. Environmental effects also play a large 
role in the post-nuclear world described by Lawrence Schoonover in his Central 
Passage (1962) which tells the story of a twenty-minute nuclear war between the 
Soviet Union and United States. Though brief, the war proves to have enormous 
repercussions for the entire globe: not only is the entire nation of Panama 
destroyed, but the Gulf Stream is affected and the temperature throughout the 
world is changed so dramatically that an Ice Age sets in. Schoonover's text 
emphasizes the repercussions that can be felt far from the nuclear battleground, 
as well as the effects that atomic weaponry has on an international scale. 
Whether describing a newly destroyed landscape or a civilization coping 
with disease and dictatorship, post-World War II novels portray a very 
apocalyptic vision of what a nuclear war would mean to humanity and the world 
as a whole. These images are a far cry from the expectations about atomic 
power before the war, as the majority of authors believed atomic technology 
would bring peace and rationality to the world. Later works provide more than 
just cynicism and doubt, however - there is also an important focus on 
maintaining realism in these novels. 
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The Element of Realism: 
The Soviet-American Arms Race took center stage in most American 
novels published during the Cold War because it was such a prominent aspect of 
U.S. culture at the time. Coupled with the apprehension regarding the very real 
possibility of nuclear war was the strong American desire to distance itself from 
Communism, and the pervading concern that Soviet spies were everywhere. 
During this period of general unrest, many authors used science fiction as a 
vehicle for social criticism. From the minor inclusion of lines such as Wolfe's 
mention of "quaking in the cellar, waiting for the bomb to land" to more involved 
allusions to espionage and specific enemies, nuclear fiction novels in the post-
war period worked hard to give their hypothetical scenarios a very realistic tone 
(215). 
Paul Brians, in his discussion of William Prochnau's 1983 novel Trinity's 
Child, writes that the author "makes the likelihood of [nuclear war and its 
repercussions] seem very high, and the likelihood of our escaping it very low" 
(Brians). Terrifying as it might be, these authors point to the possibility that is not 
nearly as far-fetched as one might hope. David Seed claims that "these science 
fiction narratives perform a role of negative prophecy where the dreaded 
outcomes are envisaged ... in such a way that the reader is induced to ponder the 
present signs of disaster" (9). Many of the works written after World War II are 
realistic in most of their details, including the enemy the United States is currently 
fighting. In the years immediately following the Second World War, it was logical 
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to assume that the enemy the United States was most likely to go to war against 
was the Soviet Union. Consequently, nearly every novel written during the Cold 
War period (including all those mentioned here) pitted the United States against 
the U.S.S.R. Neither country prevailed over the other more frequently- a 
testament to the constantly shifting balance of power in the post-war era. 
The identity of America's opponent in these novels is not the only inclusion 
that helps to base the novels on fact: the path to war was often scarily feasible as 
well. Predominantly, there is a tendency to blame the war's first Bomb on either 
human error or miscommunication. In Prochnau's work, there is an accidental 
first strike launched against the United States, which nearly incites a full-scale 
U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. Prochnau's characters are largely ignorant about the 
technology they are in control of, and, though war is eventually avoided, an air of 
confusion and chaos permeates the entire novel. As Brians comments, 
The novel illustrates only too convincingly how a nuclear war, once begun, 
can become nearly impossible to control, and how close to holocaust we 
live on a daily basis ... no other novel is as effective in depicting the 
probable course of a nuclear war. (Brians) 
Frightening as it is to consider the possibility of an unintentional nuclear war, the 
need for American and Soviet officials to install a direct line from Moscow to 
Washington, D.C. immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis is proof enough 
that communication and clarity break down quickly during a crisis situation. 
Coupled with the numerous nuclear accidents of the Cold War era, it is 
unsurprising that a mistake could very well lead to nuclear war. 
In the case of Wolfe's Limbo, communication between nations is an issue 
that defines Soviet-American relations - or at least, appears to. The war begins 
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when, "in 1970, Russia and America simultaneously came to a hallucinated 
de.cision: they, and not merely their vocabularies, were such diametric opposites 
that they could not exist side by side on the same planet" (140). It is only.after 
the two countries virtually destroy one another that they are able to see what they 
have in common - violent tendencies. In an entirely disturbing revelation, Wolfe 
determines after the war that "Russia and America were absolutely and 
· irrevocably alike ... For each was now ... the totally bureaucratized war machine" 
(140). Rather than correcting their miscommunication, or lack thereof, as 
Prochnau's characters do, Wolfe's characters learn to communicate through 
warfare and aggression - a tendency no amount of effort can eliminate from 
humanity in this narrative. 
Another element of reality present in many later nuclear fiction novels is 
seen most clearly in Shoot! Espionage and sabotage, prevalent in Soviet-
American relations both before an after World War 11, is a driving force in 
Newman's work. The book opens with Soviet sabotage of the American nuclear 
program at Oak Ridge, the original location of the Manhattan Project, and it is 
later learned that a small nu.mber of American pilots are loyal to the Soviet Union. 
When the pilots provide the U.S.S.R. with an American nuclear weapon, it 
becomes the prototype for the Soviet model - a clear allusion to the manner in 
which the Soviet Union used information gleaned from espionage during the 
Manhattan Project to produce their first atomic weapon. These details help to 
base the novels in reality, but they also serve as a means to plant the works 
squarely in the time period in which they were written. According to David Seed, 
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"science fiction narratives are not futuristic fantasies, but reworkings of ; 
metaphors circulating in the world of their composition" (1 O). In other words, . · · 
authors draw heavily on the events of the time to create a realistic and relevant 
work which must be analyzed with an understanding of the constraints of the era. 
Nuclear fiction novels are not works to be read in a timeless vacuum, because . 
they are largely influenced by the knowledge, opinions, and ideals of the time;, 
As much as they seek to influence the public, the public also influences the· 
topics they explore and the conclusions they advocate. In early nuclear fiction 
literature, the tone of most novels is reflective of the faith the nation had in the 
invention of nuclear power; after they saw the destructive abilities of atomic 
bombs, the fear of what the weapons could do immediately became the chief 
concern for leaders and citizens alike. This concern carried over into the works 
of fiction created during this time. 
The Necessity of Avoiding War: 
Fear of nuclear war made it absolutely imperative to avoid it at all costs, 
both in reality and in fiction, making prevention a common theme for authors of 
nuclear fiction in the era after World War II. For instance, the characters in 
Prochnau's novel, though they allow a minor nuclear exchange to occur, manage 
to prevent a full-scale war from occurring - but only at the very last second, 
literally minutes before the American president launches a nuclear attack on the 
Soviet Union. But all writers are not as optimistic as Prochnau, and though many 
acknowledge the need to prevent war, some scenarios escalate far beyond 
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peaceful negotiations and minor exchanges. In Brian Harris' World War Ill, 
mediation is not enough to avert the imminent nuclear war - even though neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union want the war. Mistakes and 
miscommunications are prevalent here as well. In Harris' novel, the leaders of 
both nations are nearly successful in preventing the war using peaceful channels, 
but their efforts are made useless when lesser Soviet and American officials put 
in motion events that lead to a full-scale nuclear war. Similarly, in Shoot! a wa_r 
breaks out after a television correspondent erroneously announces that the 
Soviet Union has already used nuclear weapons against the United States. The 
U.S., believing it has been attacked, retaliates in kind with its own atomic : 
weapons, and a devastating nuclear war begins. 
Perhaps the most extreme attempt to eliminate the threat of nuclear war 
comes from Wolfe's Limbo. Though the war has already ended when the novel 
begins, attempts are made to prevent further wars. Not only are American 
citizens' limbs removed under a voluntarily program designed to eradicate 
aggression, but lobotomies are performed on the doctor's deserted island to rid 
its inhabitants of the war-waging part of the brain. Wolfe goes far beyond the use 
of negotiations and peaceful discussion between nations in his novel. He claims 
that war is so inavoidable that even the removal of a portion of the brain cannot 
remove conflict from the world: when the islanders are attacked with hydrogen 
bombs, they still retaliate, in spite of their recent lobotomies. Wolfe's plotline 
seems to suggest that there is no way to rid human beings of their desire to wage 
war and perpetuate violence. 
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The:Shortcomings of Post-World War II Fiction: 
But how productive are the observations of Wolfe and others? This body 
of literature exists to enable a conversation about the possibilities, dangers, and 
developments of nuclear power, and, as Wager suggests, nuclear fiction novels 
implicitly "pose the question of what literary inquiry can do to unpack the nuclear 
obsession and help rid the world of all its bombs" (448). Many authors use their 
works as a vehicle to point out mistakes and concerns over nuclear energy, but 
few directly describe political leaders or administrations that adequately handle 
their nuclear responsibility. Wager recognizes that "few authors furnish visions of 
effective political action to prevent nuclear war," and this fact seems to be serious 
shortcoming in the function of atomic fiction (450). 
Yet the novels' criticism actually offers advice to those willing to delve 
deeper into an author's message. The development of nuclear technology, far 
from making anyone feel safer, put the world in a danger it had not previously 
experienced. As Bartter claims, "even given our technological expertise, we 
frequently feel unsafe, not at all in control of our own lives or our society" (148)~ 
The defenses and weapons that Bartter mentions only become destructive, 
however,. in ~he hands of those who are ignorant of their vast power and fail to ;' 
control them correctly. This underlying message exists in all the cautionary tales 
which warn against allowing human errors in judgment, miscommunication, and 
other mistakes and misconceptions to lead to nuclear war. Those who abuse 
nuclear technology in atomic fiction are, by and large, either unaware of its 
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enormous destructive capabilities or acting without considering the repercussions 
of their decisions. 
Nuclear fiction seeks to prevent these hypothetical situations from 
becoming a reality not just by contributing to a conversation, but by helping to 
eradicate the ignorance and irresponsibility displayed by so many of its 
characters. Involving the world in a dialogue about the realities, shortcomings, 
and dangers of nuclear weaponry enables authors to advocate the value of 
control and knowledge, and hopefully make their readers aware of the dangers of 
acting rashly. As Ruppert states, "science fiction is central to American culture, 
shaping not only our imagination, but also our weapons policy" (258). Because it 
has the ability to have such an integral impact of policy, science fiction authors 
have a unique opportunity to make an influence in the world. Encouraging 
conversation is an important contribution to the Atomic Age, because, as Wager 
asserts, "the Bomb is not just another usable theme for writers and their critics. 
The Bomb really exists. It stands ready and waiting to terminate civilization" 
(451 ). In the wake of Hiroshima, it is necessary to understand the implications of 
nuclear weaponry and acknowledge it as a reality, outside of the world of fiction. 
The realistic scenarios in these novels help readers to do just that, and allow the 
conversation to progress beyond merely understanding the technology: post-war 
fiction and its criticism helps readers to comprehend what is necessary to prevent 
another use of atomic weapons. 
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Conclusion 
The Value of Nuclear Fiction: Direct and Indirect Leadership: 
In the preface to Leading Minds, Howard Gardner defines what it means 
to be a leader: 
A leader is an individual (or rarely, a set of individuals) who significantly 
affects the thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviors of a significant number of 
individuals. Most acknowledge leaders are "direct"; they address their 
public face-to-face. But I have called attention to an unrecognized 
phenomenon - indirect leadership: In this variety of leading; individuals 
exert impact through the works they create. (ix) 
Nuclear fiction is not merely a venue for direct leaders, politicians in particular, to 
understand the general public and its opinions or concerns about the world. 
Additionally, nuclear fiction authors are leaders in their own right, because of the 
influence their works have on their readers. Taken in isolation, each of these 
writers might not seem especially powerful or significant, but when their collective 
body of works is examined as a unit, it is able to affect a far greater number of 
individuals in a more meaningful way. Nuclear fiction novelists are not only 
unique in that their leadership stems from their existence as a group, but 
because they exhibit the kind of indirect leadership Gardner references through 
the messages published in their writing. Changing the tone of one novel after the 
bombing of Hiroshima would have been insignificant and gone generally 
unnoticed; it is the revision of the entire group's mentality that is so striking in the 
era directly following World War II. 
Literature, especially science fiction, is not generally considered to have, 
an especially important bearing on politics and public opinion. The novels that 
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have succeeded in influencing perceptions and inspiring change outside the 
arena of academia are few and far between, and are hailed as timeless, pivotal 
works of canonical literature. By and large, this is not the case with the works 
discussed here. Aside from a few notable exceptions, nuclear fiction writers' are 
not particularly well known, and their work does not transcend time and location. 
The value of their contributions is exactly the opposite: the stories they tell are 
placed squarely in the era in which they were written, and are understood only in 
the historical and political constraints of that period. This temporal quality is 
much of the reason that nuclear fiction is able to interact so closely with public 
opinion; as much as the tone of the era helps to shape the message of the novel, 
authors are equally capable of influencing public perceptions about their subject 
matter. Far from being "fantastic" and irrelevant, nuclear fiction has a distinct 
place in the public sphere, and its significance cannot be overlooked. 
In her critical study of sentimental fiction, Jane Tompkins advocates 
temporal works of fiction as having value in a cultural and historical analysis of 
fiction, 
... not because they manage to escape the limitations of their particular 
time and place, but because they offer powerful examples of the way a culture 
thinks about itself, articulating and proposing solutions for the problems that 
shape a particular historical moment. .. [they] were written not so that they could 
be enshrined in any literary hall of fame, but in order to win the belief and 
influence the behavior the widest possible audience. These novelists have 
designs upon their audiences, in the sense of wanting to make people think and 
act in a particular way. (xi) 
The agenda Tompkins references can be, in the case of much of nuclear fiction, 
an imparting of knowledge and warning of potential nuclear destruction. Nuclear 
fiction is a worthwhile genre because of its close interaction with the public and 
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the construction of public opinion. These texts were able to not only help . 
individuals understand how and what to think about atomic weapons, .but_also ,1,: 
reflect the concerns of the masses and give voice to the thoughts of a .. 
generation. It was not that these novels each had a unique and special way of 
portraying the nuclear frontier; rather, their strength as a genre came in,their;:-,r1, 
ability to work in conjunction with one another to fashion a universal opinion:. __ ·1• •, 
Tompkins explains that she does not advance temporal works because they are 
different from other works, but to show what the texts share. She justifies this 
claim by arguing that "a novel's impact on the culture at large depends not on its 
escape from the formulaic and derivative, but on its tapping into a storeho'use of; 
commonly held assumptions, reproducing what is already there in a 
typical ... form" (Tompkins xvi). It is only through re-creating the innermost 
thoughts and feelings of the public that a work can interact so closely with, and 
so definitively shape, public opinion. 
Since nuclear fiction has a bearing on instilling knowledge and relaying 
information to the public, there is no question that, as a genre, the novels have 
an inherent value beyond merely entertaining its readers. Were the world to take 
more cues from literature, humanity might have a far greater understanding of 
the way that individuals think, act, and respond. As Maureen Whitebrook notes, 
A society which took its moral vocabulary from novels ... would not ask • 
itself questions about human nature, the point of human existence, or the 
meaning of human life. Rather, it would ask itself what we can do so as to 
get along with each other, how we can arrange things so as to be 
comfortable with one another, how institutions can be changed so that .; 
everyone's right to be understood has a better chance of being gratified. 
(34) 
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Fiction can do more than just offer a speculative venue: it can reflect on.the way 
humanity behaves and even propose the best way to act in accordance with this 
behavior. It also helps one to look outside oneself and appreciate individuals 
different from oneself. This can be useful, especially in nuclear fiction, for ·' 
perceiving the "kinds of suffering endured by people to whom we had previously 
not attended" as well as coming to terms with "what sort of cruelty we ourselves 
are capable of' (Whitebrook 34 ). Nuclear fiction is a versatile medium, the 
message of which is perpetually evolving to encompass new ideas, technologies, 
and events. It changes along with history, so its commentary is infinitely valuable 
for finding the pulse of public opinion at any given time, as well as understanding 
the thought process that resulted in this consensus. This makes it an important 
tool for direct leaders to recognize and utilize, but it also makes authors leaders 
in their own right, since they have the ability to affect change simply by publishing 
their messages. 
There are limitations to the claim that nuclear fiction has an inherent value, 
and it is necessary to consider that all nuclear fiction is not written in a way that 
enables it to have a place in the nuclear dialogue that is so crucial to 
understanding the Atomic Age. Yet those novels that have something to 
contribute to the conversation are a strong resource for leaders to acknowledge, 
as they helped a generation of individuals adapt to the sweeping changes that 
accompanied the creation of nuclear weapons. There was no one technique 
authors used to do this, nor was there a singular opinion expressed unanimously 
throughout all of nuclear fiction at any one time. But there are similarities in the 
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qualities possessed by many of these novels, and their messages do frequently 
converge at pivotal moments in the Atomic Age. This is also a testament to the 
way the literature is capable of adapting in conjunction with public opinion. 
Before World War II, the literature had a hopeful, optimistic tone about the as yet 
undeveloped nuclear technology; once authors saw the terrible consequences of 
the first atomic bombs, their message changed dramatically to one of apocalyptic 
predictions and unavoidable destruction. This happened in a relatively short 
period of time, considering the scale on which the fiction changed: it was not just 
one author leading the new way of thinking; instead, nuclear fiction authors 
collectively adopted this line of thought as the standard almost simultaneously 
across the board. 
It was no accident that once censorship laws were lifted and Hiroshima 
proved nuclear energy a reality, the quantity of novels written about the subject 
increased exponentially. The more prevalent atomic weapons became, the more 
important it was to understand their power and their capabilities - both positive 
and negative. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated that 
nuclear weaponry could, and would, play an enormous role in international 
relations, and that its effects were universal. Once it became clear that nuclear 
energy would have an important, and controversial, place in the future, it became 
necessary to explore its implications and formulate an opinion about its 
existence. This was not simply a task for the world's leaders, but also for the 
public, which was as much a part of this new reality as anyone. Moreover, 
holding leaders accountable for adhering to public opinion requires an educated 
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and informed constituency which is able to articulate what its opinion is.· The , ·_ 
nuclear dialogue, and all its components, helps to create this kind of engaged 
citizenry. 
As the number of nuclear fiction works increased, the voice of its authors 
grew more powerful, and their representations were capable of playing an even 
larger role in shaping the public's perception of nuclear technology. This left : 
them with a greater responsibility to readers, but it also helped to elevate the 
genre's status as a body of literature. It was easy to ignore the publication of a 
few novels that alluded to the creation or use of nuclear weapons; but the.works 
published after World War II were more numerous, more realistic, and more 
extreme. What these later novels retained, however, was the authors' ability to 
use speculation to explore events outside the sphere of reality and instill 
knowledge. This capability, unique to fiction writing, is essential for scenarios like 
nuclear war, since the reality of such a war would mean horrific consequences 
for the entire world. Because of this, Jacques Derrida notes that "nuclear war 
can only be approached speculatively, [so] literature - and particularly science 
fiction - can occupy a space equal to sociological, strategic and other modes of 
speculation" (Derrida}. Once its worth is appropriately appreciated, nuclear 
fiction is able to play a large role in the way the public understands the 
technology and its influence on their life. As part of the conversation about the 
Atomic Age, the messages of nuclear fiction make, as Seed asserts, "constant 
interventions in the debates ... on such matters as civil defense, foreign policy and 
internal security" {9}. Nuclear energy continues, even today, to become more 
. ' 
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prevalent and relevant, making an understanding of nuclear technology vital for _ 
grasping world events, and the role of those who can further or alter knowledge 
about atomic weapons ever more significant. 
The Implications of this Study: 
This project is not solely a commentary on leadership studies, nor is its::: 
significance exclusive to the field of English. Rather, it is an effort to unite the 
two fields in a way that offers valuable contributions to both areas of study while . 
pointing out the necessity of further interaction between the topics of leadership 
and literature. The few works which are traditionally regarded as having . 
something to contribute to leadership studies are those which are either included 
in the canon of English literature, or those which directly demonstrate a leader-· 
follower relationship and have a particular lesson to teach about leadership. 
Because of the value of fiction that does not meet these two constraints, the 
exclusion of temporal literary works is presently an oversight in leadership 
studies, as novels have much to contribute to the development of able, qualified, 
and knowledgeable leaders. 
The debate about the significance of fiction in society is one that dates 
back to Plato and the publication of his Republic. In this text, Plato decries art 
and literature as unworthy of inclusion in his hypothetical society. Any literature 
that is permitted, he says, must be that of consisting moral, virtuous topics and 
characters. He places extensive importance on the value of education for ,, 
shaping leaders, but he also believes in censoring literature so as not to present 
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the evil side of fiction, as art (literature included) has a tendency to corrupt · _. 
because it cannot even create reality- just a picture of reality. Plato's warin.ess 
toward literature is extreme, as he seeks to essentially rid the world of its 
existence, but he does make an interesting point which validates literature's,~-' 
importance: he acknowledges its strong capacity to influence. Were it not so; 
influential, so crucial in the creation of intellect and specific beliefs, there would 
be no need to deal with it so stringently - to censor or outlaw it completely. 
Thus, Plato finds himself in contradiction, where he can neither fully advocate the 
inclusion of a potentially dangerous vehicle for unethical thought, nor avoid 
admitting the important role literature plays in education and the formation of 
citizens. 
The debate about the value and place of literature has been ongoing ever 
since, and the literary world has predominantly pointed to canonical texts to 
defend the worth of fictional works. While these enduring works undoubtedly 
contribute to society, theirs is not the only worthwhile type of influence. 
Canonical texts remain relevant today; their lessons, characters, and plotlines 
are ones in which insights applicable to the present time can still be found. They 
seek to make a commentary about society and humanity that will be pertinent 
hundreds of years later by constructing their stories amid timeless 
circumstances. Conversely, nuclear fiction does no such thing - nor does any 
temporal work. But while canonical texts offer thoughts about humanity that 
endure long after they are written, temporal works explain how society was when 
they were written, a contribution that, from a cultural and historical standpoint, 
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cannot be overlooked. Temporal literature's value, then, lies in helping readers. 
to understand their present surroundings, the possible implications thereof, and 
how they came to be. From a literary point of view, understanding the 
constraints the writer worked within, and how readers reacted to the text once it 
was published, is critical for examining the novel; literature does not exist in a 
vacuum, and while some writers create works that seem eternally relevant, it is 
valuable to understand their surroundings when reading their works so that one:· 
might determine how the text interacted with larger society at the time.:, For·• 
temporal works, this is not simply an additional way to evaluate their message, it 
is the only way. The interaction of society and literature is the sole function of the 
novel, and to examine itunder any other premise is to ultimately diminish its: 
worth as a cultural and historical tool by which the pulse of society can be taken. 
Since temporal texts are so clearly representative of the era in which they 
were written, it follows that they could easily serve as a valuable tool for the.study 
of leadership. Just as literature does not exist in a timeless vacuum, leadership 
is strongly affected by the world around it. Different leadership styles are 
successful in different environments, and there are numerous variables to 
consider when choosing a leadership technique. In order to select the most 
appropriate style of leadership, one must first understand the contexts into which 
one is stepping, and temporal fiction can provide this information. These novels 
dually reflect the sentiments of the public and shape readers' perceptions of the 
subject matter, and thus serve as an underutilized and valuable tool for leaders 
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who wish to better understand their surroundings and become more informed 
leaders. 
The intersection of leadership and literature is not one that is frequently 
examined or typically highly-valued. Yet fictional works, even those outside the 
canon, have something to offer in terms of improving the way that leaders 
understand their followers and how the public's opinion is constructed and 
influenced. In many ways, the consideration of works outside the canon debunks 
the widely-held Great Man theory because it furthers the writings of lesser-known 
authors and texts, and places value on the contributions they make to society. 
But the impact that nuclear fiction has had on the Atomic Age with respect to its 
participation in the proverbial nuclear dialogue proves the worth of novels that 
are rarely recognized outside the genre of science fiction. Nuclear fiction has 
made great strides since its inception in the nineteenth century, but it will not fully 
realize its potential as a leadership tool until it is properly acknowledged and 
used as such. 
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